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ABSTRACT
How Experts Judge Creativity: A Field Study of the Assessment of Creative Output
by
Michael Robert Seyle
August 2018
Chair: Pam Scholder Ellen
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business
Creativity is a fundamental component of innovation and critical for long-term business
success. Identifying the products and ideas that are most creative, and therefore worthy of
further development and investment, is an essential part of the creative process. However,
experimental research into creativity over the past 20 years has yielded inconsistent and
contradictory results. Moreover, this same research has shown that organizations struggle to
identify their most creative products and ideas for further development. Critics suggest
organizational creativity research may suffer from measurement misspecification due to a
misalignment between existing construct definitions of creativity as a response that is both
“novel and useful” and experimental studies that use only a single item, creativity, to measure
creative output. This research investigates whether the theorized misalignment may be due, in
part, to the research use of judges with little or no experience in the creative domain and their
failure to understand the criteria, approaches, and techniques that expert judges actually use to
assess creative output. To better understand how these issues may affect research results, this
research utilized Naturalistic Decision Making field-study methods to investigate how expert
judges assess the creative output of experienced professionals in the setting of a creativity awards
contest. Through a series of interviews, observations, think-aloud protocols, and simulations

xii

with expert judges of creativity award contests, this research identifies six factors experts use to
assess professional level creative output, and uncovers the processes, approach, and challenges
involved in the real-world assessment of creative products and ideas. Recommendations for how
assessing creativity can be improved in research and practice are discussed as well as suggestions
for future research.

INDEX WORDS: Creativity, Intuition, Analysis, Experts, Creative Output, Measurement, Field
Study, Contests, Judgment, Decision Making
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I
I.1

INTRODUCTION

Background
The importance of creativity to business success and the global economy continues to

garner attention in both business press and academia. Expanding on Drucker’s concept of the
“knowledge-based” organization, Florida argues human creativity has become “the decisive
source of competitive advantage” for businesses and “the ultimate economic resource” for
organizations (Florida, 2002). In 2008, the Conference Board reported that corporate executives
view creativity as a key capability organizations need to succeed:
U.S. employers rate creativity and innovation among the top five skills that will increase
in importance over the next five years and rank it among the top challenges facing CEOs
(Conf. Board, 2008).
A 2010 survey of 1,500 U.S. corporate CEOs extended the significance of creativity to the Csuite, stating, “Creativity is now the most important leadership quality for success in business,
outweighing even integrity and global thinking” (IBM, 2010).
Creativity is viewed as an essential element and precursor to innovation that drives
organizational success and economic prosperity (Amabile & Khaire, 2008). The importance of
creativity to both business and global economies is reflected in the impact creative industries
have on domestic production. Creative industries, such as the arts and cultural goods and
services, are estimated to contribute more than $500 billion to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product,
or more than 3.2% of current-dollar GDP, compared to other industries, like travel and tourism,
that generate only 2.6% of GDP (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013). Advertising
creativity alone is estimated to generate almost $200 billion in U.S. gross domestic output, or
20% of all arts and cultural goods and services (US BEA 2013). Likewise, in the United
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Kingdom, creative industries supply more than 1.5 million jobs, which amounted to more than
5% of the U.K.’s total employment in 2010 (UK Dept. Culture Media and Sport, 2011).
I.2

Problem Statement
Given creativity’s importance to business success and global economic output, it is

unsurprising that individual and organizational creativity has been the subject of increasingly
intensive research in the fields of management, psychology, education, and the arts over the past
60 years (Runco, 2004). Despite this intense academic interest across disciplines, however,
understanding of creativity remains fragmented into specialized subfields, often resulting in
inconsistent, and conflicting, research findings (Amabile, 2012). Recently, scholars have raised
concerns that these inconsistent and contradictory creativity research results may be due to
construct measurement misspecification, incomplete methodological approaches, or poor
construct validity (Sullivan & Ford, 2010; Montag et al., 2012). Many of these concerns relate
to how creativity is defined, both as a construct and operationally, as well as the processes
utilized in assessing creative output in research studies (Montag et al., 2012).
Most extant creativity research has utilized consensual judgment methods to assess the
“overall creativity” of products or ideas as a unitary construct or single item. This approach
contradicts the numerous existing construct definitions of creativity as either a two-item or a
multi-faceted construct (Sullivan & Ford, 2010). The majority of published research to date also
has relied upon experimental studies that employ children, students, and individuals with little or
no experience or training in creativity as study participants (Montag et al., 2012). These
inexperienced experimental subjects raise concerns about the quality of the items assessed and
the validity of their results (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012). Moreover, the majority of studies have
utilized educators, students, and other individuals with little or no established creativity expertise
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as judges to measure the creative output of study subjects. In short, it appears existing creativity
research may suffer from the triple-threat combination of low construct validity, measurement
misspecification, and incomplete assessment methods. To investigate the nature and extent of
these potential shortcomings, and gain insight into the processes, criteria, and approaches used to
assess creative products and ideas in practice, this research examined how established domain
experts make judgments of the creative output of professionals in a real world setting.
I.3

Statement of Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this field study was to investigate the processes and criteria expert judges

use in assessing the output creativity of those who regularly create products and ideas in creative
industries that are subsequently submitted to award contests. Understanding how domain experts
make judgments about the level of professionals’ creativity in situations where judges face
significant time, uncertainty, and ambiguity constraints provides useful insights into how
creativity is assessed in real-world situations. Such insights may also: (1) increase the field’s
understanding of the challenges creativity researchers face in assessing creative output in
experimental studies, (2) identify the key criteria real world judges use in assessing creativity;
(3) suggest more effective assessment methods to improve the overall reliability and validity of
creativity research, and (4) provide ideas that organizations can use to better discern the most
promising creative product and ideas for development and investment.
To explore these issues, this research examines how domain experts judge the creativity of
entries in a professional award program by investigating the following research questions:
1. What criteria do expert judges of creativity awards contests report using to assess the
creativity of products and ideas; in particular, do experts use the “novel and useful” definition of
creativity that is employed in most creativity research or some other criteria?
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2. What processes do experts use as they judge creativity in contest settings; are the
processes involved in creativity contests similar to or different from those used in the experts’
professional workplace settings?
3. What types of cognitive processing are involved in expert judgment of creative products
and ideas; do experts use intuition, rational analysis, a combination of both, or something else
when judging creativity contests?
4. What do experts say are the differences between how experts and non-experts make
judgments of creativity; what kinds of mistakes might a novice make in judging creativity?
5. What biases and heuristics do expert judges acknowledge encountering when judging
creativity in real-world situations, and how do they attempt to deal with them?
I.4

Research Approach
After receiving approval for the study from the university’s institutional review board, this

research began investigating the steps, processes, and experiences of experts judging entries in a
creativity awards contest. Identified expert participants were all professionals in various creative
industries with significant experience in assessing creative output in organizational settings as
well as having acted as judges in numerous regional, national, and international creativity award
programs.
The main method of data collection involved in-depth interviews of these experts.
Following an engaged scholarship research approach, the investigation originated with a pilot
study that conducted open-ended interviews of managers in different creative industries. This
approach revealed the nature of creativity assessment in organizational settings and identified
key challenges facing organizations that seek to exploit their most creative products and ideas.
To gain further understanding into the processes involved in judging creative products and ideas,
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the researcher subsequently spent three days immersed in a creativity awards event, observing
expert judges during the judging process, collecting information about the awards program, and
interviewing contest judges and the organizers of the awards program. In-person interviews of
participants were conducted using Applied Cognitive Task Analysis techniques in an effort to
uncover non-conscious routines and steps in the judging process. Several participant judges also
took part in simulated judging exercises and think-aloud protocols during judging of contest
entries to provide a better explanation of their cognitive effort. After the awards event,
additional phone interviews were conducted with domain experts who had served as judges for
the same awards program in prior years. A total of 12 in-depth interviews of expert judges were
administered during and after the three-day judging event, and five judges also participated in
simulation and think-aloud exercises during the judging event. In addition to the interviews,
simulations and observations, archival data on the judges’ numerical scores across ten creativity
award contests over five years were obtained from the contest organizers. This data was
obtained in non-attributable format for use in testing the judges’ inter-rater reliability and
comparing rater agreement within and across awards contests.
The combination of interviews, many involving Applied Cognitive Task Analysis with
simulations and think-aloud exercises, along with direct observation of the judging event, and a
longitudinal analysis of contest scores, did not allow for complete triangulation of data, but did
help provide a deep analysis of creativity assessment in a field setting. A comprehensive review
of the literature on the assessment of creativity and expert judgment, the pilot study, and direct
observations helped shape the collection of additional data from past judges. Preliminary coding
classifications were developed in advance of interviews, simulations and think-aloud exercises,
and coding was refined as the research progressed, taking into account data previously collected
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and the frameworks underlying the data analysis. To help insure reliability of the coding
process, two independent researchers check-coded several interview transcripts and
disagreements were discussed until consensus was reached on a coding scheme that was used by
the researcher for the remaining transcripts.
I.5

Researcher Background and Assumptions
The researcher who conducted this study is employed as an executive at a global

architecture and design organization and has more than a decade of direct experience working
with professionals engaged in generating creative products and ideas on a regular basis. This
background and practical experience provides a unique understanding about creativity in the
workplace and the challenges organizations face in the development of creative and innovative
output. This background, however, also tends to color and potentially limit the researcher’s
perceptions and beliefs about creative work and how creativity is judged. As a result, the
researcher took additional steps to identify and address potential preconceptions and biases that
might affect the neutrality of the research, including peer reviews of the research design and
process, consultation with academics and consultants not connected to the research, journaling
about the decisions and choices made in the study’s design and analysis, and informing each of
the research participants of the researcher’s position, such that they could raise any concerns they
might have during the research process. To help strengthen the validity of the research and
address the subjectivity of the researcher, interview candidates were not prescreened as to their
viewpoints and were selected by the contest organizers based solely on their qualifications as
domain expert judges of numerous creativity contests. Multiple data sources were sought to help
identify diverse perspectives and possible alternative explanations for the findings and
information discovered. Information that potentially contradicted any researcher assumptions or
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existing theoretical concepts was preserved and considered separately, to prevent forcing the data
to fit any preconceptions.
Based on past experience and understanding of the challenges businesses face in assessing
creativity, as well as concerns raised in the literature about judgments of creative output, the
following three assumptions grounded this research. First, creativity is a social construct that is
dependent upon the experiences, values, and utility ascribed to it by individuals who hold a
position of authority, respect, or recognition within a particular domain or industry. As such,
creativity cannot be measured objectively through scientific analysis or accurately described as a
physical property—whether something is considered creative is an intersubjective assessment or
shared meaning developed through interaction with others and by means of comparison,
expectation and personal aesthetic judgment. Second, although all individuals can be creative in
some way and at some period, those who are employed in creative industries to generate creative
output have special skills, training, talent, motivation, supports, and experience that are
necessary to inform creative products and ideas for business. This second assumption leads to a
third, wherein those who have been employed as creative professionals for many years and who
have been identified by their peers as masters of their craft, such that they are selected to judge
the creativity of other professionals, have achieved a level of experience to be considered
“experts” in their domain.
I.6

Rationale and Significance
The rationale for this study arises from the challenges business leaders and managers of

creative industries face in identifying the most creative products and ideas for further
development and investment. In addition, academic research into creativity has struggled to
produce consistent and reliable findings about the nature of creativity, its antecedents and
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consequences, and methods to motivate individuals and increase creative output. One possible
reason for inconsistent, and often contradictory, results may stem from how the dependent
variable of “creative outcomes” is measured and assessed. A deeper understanding of how
experts judge creativity in field settings should lead to improved processes for assessing creative
output and lend new insights into how to measure, increase, and expand creativity.
I.7

Summary of Remaining Chapters
The remaining chapters of this dissertation cover the following areas:
•

Chapter 2 - Literature Review: This section provides a general review of the literature
on creativity and the assessment of creative outcomes. It examines previous research on
the definitions and processes of creativity, measurement of creative output in
experimental studies, and the decision-making aspects of creative evaluation and
assessment. This chapter highlights concerns about possible measurement
misspecification and the validity and reliability of existing quantitative research. The
review also generally explores the research on expert decision-making processes,
particularly expert intuition and the heuristics and biases that accompany its use. The
review establishes that a lack of research has explored how creativity is evaluated in realworld settings and the processes domain experts use in judging creativity; in doing, it
identifies the gap in literature this study is designed to address. This section also
describes the two main theories of information processing relating to judgment and
decision making, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and Cognitive Continuum
Theory (CCT), explores how each theory applies to previous research, and the constructs
and predictions of each theory about how decisions are made and outcomes are evaluated.
This section illustrates how CEST and CCT differentially view the role and impact of
intuition and analysis in decision-making, the nature and impact of heuristics and human
cognitive biases, and the reliability of judgments under different conditions. This chapter
also provides an overview of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) as a framework for
investigating and understanding judgment and decision making of experts in field
settings.

•

Chapter 3 - Research Methodology: This chapter justifies the use of a qualitative,
process focused case study approach, as it seeks to answer how experts judge creativity
where the researcher has no control over activities, behaviors, and events of interest. This
chapter also discusses the engaged scholarship approach to research as a means of
increasing the relevance of the study by including information and perspectives from key
stakeholders. The process used to select domain experts with significant experience in
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judging and evaluating creativity in professional settings is also discussed. This chapter
also provides an outline of the data collection, reduction, and triangulation strategies
utilized to both increase understanding of the context and improve validity by
incorporating: (1) multiple sources of evidence, (2) a case study database, and (3) a chain
of evidence. It subsequently explains the methods used to analyze the various types of
data obtained.
•

Chapter 4 – Findings
Chapter 4 presents the key findings of the in-depth interviews, simulations and thinkaloud exercises, field observations of an actual creativity awards judging event, and the
results of inter-rater reliability testing of judges’ numerical contest scores. Extensive
illustrative quotes from participant interviews are provided to allow the reader an
opportunity to explore participants’ views in their own words.

•

Chapter 5 – Discussion
This section provides an analysis of the findings and a synthesis of the data in an effort to
make sense of the meaning of the data. It additionally explores how the data relates to
the theoretical frameworks applied in this research study. Possible linkages and logical
inferences suggested by the data are explored, and the main contributions of the study to
theory and practice are discussed.

•

Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations
This final chapter provides the researcher’s conclusions based on study findings and
analysis, as well as recommendations for changes to research methods and practice based
on the results of the study. Recommendations for future research are also discussed.
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II

LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1 Introduction
The purpose of this field study was to investigate the processes and criteria expert judges
use in assessing the creativity of output by individuals who regularly create products in creative
industries. Specifically, the research sought to understand how domain experts make judgments
about the level of creativity of products and ideas, in situations where judges face extreme time
pressure, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Before conducting the study, critical reviews of the
literature on creativity research, construct measurement, decision making and expert cognition
were conducted. The literature review informed the research design, data collection, and
analysis phases of this study.
This review of creativity literature traces the approaches, methods, results, and challenges
of research into the nature and elements of creativity; in particular, the ways in which creative
outcomes are measured and assessed. Moreover, as discernment of creative outcomes involves
many aspects of judgment and decision making, this review explores the constructs and theories
relating to decision making, particularly as it concerns experts, rational choice, and intuition.
Lastly, literature relating to how individuals make decisions in field settings is reviewed.
II.2 Review of Literature
Academic study of creativity began to flourish after J. P. Guilford’s 1950 presidential
address to the American Psychological Association (Mumford, 2003; Amabile, 2012). However,
for the first 30 years of inquiry, creativity was considered solely a psychological “trait” or
quality, consisting of unique attributes and “divergent” thinking abilities only possessed by
gifted individuals (Amabile, 2012). As a result, almost all creativity research until the mid-
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1990s focused on the inherent differences and abilities of exceptionally creative individuals
(Mumford, 2003).
Over the past 20 years, creativity research has undergone a number of significant shifts in
both the development of theory and the use of various research methodologies (Mumford, 2003).
This research has also expanded from psychology to sociology, education, economics, and
management (Runco, 2004). As a result of its multi-disciplinary focus, the scope of
understanding creativity’s processes, antecedents, and consequences has grown exponentially,
but not without having paid a price (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). The lack of inter-disciplinary
research has resulted in fragmented, often conflicting and confusing, findings and the
development of numerous competing theories of creativity, how it functions, how to measure it,
and how to improve creative thinking and outcomes (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).
II.2.1 Definitions of Creativity
What creativity is, and what it is not, hangs as the mythical albatross around the neck of
scientific research on creativity (Prentky, 2000: 97).
One of the most significant challenges to creativity research the lack of a consistent
definition. More than 50 years ago, Rhodes reported having identified 40 different definitions of
creativity (Rhodes, 1961). Twenty-seven years later, a review of published psychological
research uncovered more than 60 different definitions for the concept (Taylor, 1988). These
various definitions reflect the growing, but fragmented, academic interest in the study of
creativity from different domains and research perspectives.
When used as an adjective, the word “creative” is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as,
“relating to or involving the use of the imagination or original ideas to create something” or
“having good imagination or original ideas.” As a noun, creative is defined as, “a person whose
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job involves creative work.” As a verb, to “create” is defined as meaning to “bring (something)
into existence,” or “cause (something) to happen as a result of one’s actions.” Creativity also has
been defined as “inventiveness; the use of imagination or original ideas to create something.”1
Synonyms of creativity include cleverness, imagination, ingenuity, inventiveness, originality,
resourcefulness, inspiration, and vision (Roget, 2013).
In creativity research, the term “creative” has developed numerous inherent meanings
over the past 65 years that can refer to a person, group or organization, or to the process,
products, and environment in which people work (Batey, 2012). For example, when creativity is
viewed as an aspect of a person, the definition might arise from the traits and abilities inherent in
creative genius (Runco, 2004; Runco & Jaeger, 2012). If the focus is on process, a definition
might relate the mental activities and procedural steps involved in a divergent thinking exercise
(Mumford, 2003).
The lack of a shared definition is certainly not due to a shortage of effort or attention. In
1996, Amabile attempted to define creativity from a social-psychological approach stating, “a
product or response will be judged as creative to the extent that (1) it is both a novel and an
appropriate, useful, correct, or valuable response to the task at hand, and (2) the task is heuristic
rather than algorithmic” (Amabile, 1996: 35). Sternberg and Lubart (1999) defined creativity
more objectively as “the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected)
and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)” (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999:

1

The origin of the word “create” is believed to be of late Middle English in the sense of “form out of nothing” and
relating to “a divine or supernatural being” originally from the Latin creat- “produced,” from the verb creare.
“However, the verb form derives from a Proto-Indo-European root kerh2, which is believed originally to have
meant, ‘grow’ and in Latin its original meaning was ‘to make (something) grow.’” The past participle of creare is
“to make, bring forth, produce, beget” which is related to crescere, or “arise, grow.”
(http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=create, accessed February 9, 2015).
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3). This seeming confluence of conceptual understanding lead Mumford to conclude: “Over the
course of the last decade, however, we seem to have reached a general agreement that creativity
involves the production of novel, useful products” (Mumford, 2003: 110). However, despite
these various attempts to capture the essence of creativity, many authors still believe a widely
accepted or inter-disciplinary definition of creativity remains elusive and that the lack of a
workable definition hampers efforts to formally identify and measure the construct (Sullivan &
Ford, 2010; Batey, 2012; Montag et al., 2012; Simonton, 2012).
This study investigated the assessment of creative individuals’ output (Montag, et al.,
2012), as opposed to creative processes, individual traits, or the environments surrounding
creative activity,; accordingly,the research necessarily focused only on creative products and
ideas. Thus, for the purposes of the present research, and for the reasons outlined in the next
section, this study adopts as a starting point Amabile’s proffered definition of creative output as a
product or response that is both novel and appropriate to the task, where the task is heuristic
rather than algorithmic (Amabile, 1996; 2012).
II.2.2 Creativity Research
To understand the divergent views of creativity and why a standard definition of
creativity is necessary, it is important to trace the development of creativity research over the
past 30 years. According to the componential theory of creativity, developed by Amabile in
1983 and refined in the years since, creativity occurs in the combination of three “withinindividual” components and one external component. The three internal components are: (1)
domain-relevant skills, i.e., expertise or knowledge in the relevant domain or domains; (2)
creativity-relevant process abilities, i.e., cognitive abilities and personality attributes that enable
novel thinking; and (3) task motivation, specifically intrinsic motivation to engage in the task.
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The single external component of the theory is the surrounding social or workplace environment
the individual acts within (Amabile, 1983; 2012).
Amabile’s componential theory therefore predicts, “creativity should be at its highest
when an intrinsically motivated person with high domain expertise and high skill in creative
thinking works in an environment high in supports for creativity” (Amabile, 2012: 3). Domainrelevant skills relate to the knowledge, experience, skills, and abilities of the particular technical
or professional arena where an individual has gained expertise. This domain-relevant expertise
provides the background the individual will likely draw upon to develop new combinations and
to evaluate the viability of the various options created (Amabile, 1983). Creativity-relevant
process abilities include “a cognitive style and personality characteristics that are conducive to
independence, risk-taking, and taking new perspectives on problems, as well as a disciplined
work style and skills in generating ideas” (Amabile, 2012: 3).
Task, or intrinsic, motivation has received the most scholarly attention in recent years,
and the inconsistent, and often contradictory, research findings in this area frame many of the
current definitional dilemmas. The intrinsic principle of motivation posits “people are most
creative when they feel motivated primarily by the interest, enjoyment, satisfaction, and
challenge of the work itself” (Amabile 2012: 4). However, the external factors that explicitly
motivate the organization or the individual—so-called extrinsic motivators—as well as other
workplace, mood, and compensation factors, can have either a positive or negative effect on an
individual’s intrinsic motivation and creativity (Oldham & Cummings, 1996; George & Zhou,
2007).
One of the most widely used frameworks for understanding the concept of creativity is
the “Four P’s” model, a schematic representation that divides creativity into four categories of
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person, process, place, and product (Runco, 2004). Initially developed by Rhodes (1961), the
Four P’s identify each aspect of creativity as an attribute of: (1) the Person—i.e., some
individuals tend to be more creative than others; (2) the Process—i.e., particular types of
thinking, perception and behaviors are likely to produce creativity more readily than others; (3)
Place—i.e., physical and social environmental factors can have the effect of increasing or
decreasing creativity in individuals; and, (4) Product—i.e., some ideas, solutions and designs can
be judged as more creative than others (Rhodes, 1961; Runco, 2004).
One of the most comprehensive models of the Process aspect of creativity is that
developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1996), and consists of five stages: (i) preparation, (ii)
incubation, (iii) insight, (iv) evaluation, and (v) elaboration. Preparation involves the
preparatory work that focuses an individual's mind on the problem and explores the problem’s
dimensions. Incubation is the stage where the problem is internalized into the unconscious mind
and nothing appears externally to be happening. Insight arises when the creative person begins
to make connections between previously unassociated concepts and a creative idea arises from
non-conscious processing into conscious awareness. Evaluation occurs when the newly
developed idea is mentally challenged and tested for its appropriateness to the problem or goal.
Finally, elaboration is the stage where the idea is further refined and then applied.
The Product category of the Four P’s creativity model and the evaluation stage in
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) five-stage model provide the focal points for this research study. The
Product dimension focuses on the creative outcomes and results of the creative process,
specifically whether they are judged as more or less creative. The evaluation stage is crucial in
creativity assessment as it provides the first opportunity to objectively assess the fitness of
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generated ideas during the creative process. For organizations, the evaluation stage serves as a
critical juncture where products and ideas are assessed for
potential value and further development. An error in assessment at this stage can prevent
creative ideas and products from being realized or result in unnecessary development effort and
excessive cost. Businesses must also be able to assess the creativity of fully developed ideas and
products before incorporating them into to strategic plans or introducing them to the
marketplace. In research, the assessment of creative products or outcomes at either the
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evaluation stage or conclusion of the creative process has been called “the bedrock of all studies
of creativity” (Cropley & Cropley, 2008; MacKinnon 1978: 187).

Figure 1 Schematic Model of Creativity Concepts
II.2.3 Creative Outcomes
Similar to the challenges of defining creativity overall, the definitions of creative
products and outcomes also have varied considerably over the past 50 years. Brogden and
Sprecher (1964) defined a product simply as a physical object, a theoretical system, an equation,
or a technique. Research studies using this definition attempt to explain the differences between
creative and ordinary products (Santanen, Briggs, & Vreede, 2004). Jackson and Messick (1965)
defined a creative product as being “unusual” when compared to other products: it is appropriate
to the context of the situation; it shifts the constraints and boundaries of the situation; and it
condenses both simplicity and complexity in such a way that the product may at first appear
simple but is in reality quite complex. Condensing these definitions, Amabile et al. (1986)
operationally defined a product as creative if it was both novel and appropriate in response to a
non-algorithmic task (Santanen et al., 2004).
However, the past 30 years of research using these definitions of creativity and creative
products has resulted in conflicting, and often contradictory, experimental outcomes across
numerous disciplines (Batey, 2012; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). For example, in the socialpsychological study of creativity, particularly with regard to its motivational dimension,
researchers have struggled to find common ground in methods to increase creativity (Hennessey
& Amabile, 2010). A significant body of research shows extrinsic motivators, such as financial
rewards or recognition, have a detrimental effect on creative output by increasing a sense of
being controlled and reducing intrinsic motivation, a fundamental aspect of creativity according
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to the componential theory (Amabile, 1996; Hennessey, 2003). Researchers following a
behavioral perspective, however, have developed substantial empirical evidence showing how
extrinsic rewards and recognition can increase creativity, particularly in the workplace, by
focusing individuals on the need for creative ideas, without any resulting detrimental impact on
intrinsic motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Eisenberger & Shanock, 2003; Eisenberger &
Aselage, 2009).
Similarly, research into the effects one’s work environment has on creativity has failed to
reach consensus. For example, the effect of time pressure on creativity has been shown to have a
detrimental impact on creativity in some studies (Amabile et al., 1996), while other studies have
found that individuals respond positively to time pressures and produce greater levels of
creativity (Madjar & Oldham, 2002). Studies also have shown a complicated relationship
between time pressure, the person, and the situation, resulting in an inverted U-shape relationship
that is mediated by personality (Baer & Oldham, 2006). Likewise, summaries of research into
the related concepts of feedback, monitoring by supervisors, and evaluation of work product
have shown these environmental factors to have quite different effects on creative output
depending on how information is presented and processed by the individual (Zhou, 2003). In
organizational research, some studies have shown the use of clear overall goals can increase
motivation and creative output (Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman, 1996), while many others
suggest such external expectations have a direct negative impact on creativity (Shalley & Perry
Smith, 2001; West, 2002).
A number of meta-analyses and reviews of extant research also have failed to coalesce
the disparate findings surrounding various approaches to creativity research, stating that “few
solid conclusions regarding creativity can be drawn” (see Byron & Khazanchi, 2012; Oldham &
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Baer, 2006; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Montag, et al., 2012). For example, Byron &
Khazanchi (2012) reviewed more than 60 experimental and field studies applying either Learned
Industriousness Theory (LIT) or Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and concluded that neither
theory completely accounted for the inconsistent and contradictory results of the various studies
reviewed (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012). The authors also identified a number of study limitations
that may have contributed to a lack of validity and reliability, including that the majority of the
research subjects were children, students, or individuals who were not required or expected to
perform creatively on a routine basis. Additionally, most of the studies did not occur in creative
or professional settings, and the few studies situated in workplace settings did not focus
specifically on creative employees (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012). As a result, the conclusions
reached by LIT and SDT research cannot extend to questions of workplace creativity among
professionals or employees in creative occupations. The authors also point out most of the tasks
involved in the 60 studies reviewed offered little opportunity for high levels of creativity,
explaining, “the studies in this analysis were more likely to employ tasks that were relatively low
in complexity” and concluding the “proposed models may better explain incremental creativity
than radical creativity” (Byron & Khazanchi, 2012: 825). In conclusion, the authors urge further
research into the nature of creativity in the workplace using experienced creative employees as
participants.
Another recent review of the creativity literature offered a different perspective to explain
the inconsistent results of existing research. Montag, et al. (2012) criticized most creativity
research approaches as unnecessarily focused and organized according to the antecedents of
creativity, which may have resulted in incorrect conclusions and inconsistencies among prior
studies and the inability to develop generalizations from those results (Montag et al, 2012).
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Montag and colleagues instead propose a new framework for organizing and understanding
workplace creativity constructs based on workplace performance literature. Instead of thinking
of creativity as a unitary construct, they contend creativity should be considered a research
domain with multiple constructs. The authors hypothesize at least two separate sets of constructs
may exist within the creativity domain, i.e., Creative Performance Behaviors (CPB) and Creative
Outcome Effectiveness (COE), with differential definitions and causal directions between them.
The competing perspectives, inconsistent results, and contradictory findings of creativity studies
over the past few decades have caused some commentators to question the appropriateness of the
various frameworks, theories, and methodologies used in studies of creativity, as well as whether
the definitions utilized are appropriate and complete, and whether the construct of creativity
itself needs to be reconsidered (Sullivan & Ford, 2010; Montag et al., 2012).
II.3 Measurement of Creative Output
As outlined above, how creativity is measured depends in large part on the construct and
operational definitions used as well as the research perspective employed. Separating creative
behaviors from creative output as proposed by Montag et al. (2012) requires an understanding of
the methods that have been used to measure creative output. Batey (2012) developed a heuristic,
multi-level framework to account for different levels of analysis, facets, and approaches to
measuring creativity. Within this taxonomic framework, shown in the diagram from Batey’s
article reproduced below, creativity can be analyzed from an individual, team, organization, or
culture level by considering the four facets of creativity—i.e., traits, process, press, or product.
Measures of creativity under this heuristic model can employ: (1) objective measures, (2)
subjective assessments through self-reports, or (3) external appraisals or ratings by subject matter
experts (Batey, 2012).
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Figure 2 Measures of Creativity (Batey, 2012)
From a practice perspective, the assessment of creative ideas and output is especially
important for organizations during the idea evaluation or “validation stage” (Montag et al., 2012;
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). However, organizational creativity research has shown managers do
not differentiate between creativity, innovation, or problem solving, incorrectly viewing the three
distinctly separate constructs as inextricably connected (Banks, Calvey, Owen, & Russell, 2002).
Evaluating the most promising ideas and creative output during the iterative stages of the
creative process requires accurate forecasting of which ideas and products are most creative, as
well as which have the best chance for ultimate success (Daily & Mumford, 2006; Lonergan,
Scott, and Mumford, 2004). Thus, evaluation of creative ideas and products is one of the most
critical steps in the creative process, yet organizations struggle to make appropriate decisions
about the creative ideas and products they develop (Harvey & Kou, 2013). For example, groups
have been shown to prefer relatively average ideas produced by their members over more novel
ideas created by other individuals (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006). Unlike idea
generation, which is considered a divergent creative thinking behavior, idea evaluation is a
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convergent decision-making activity that occurs in later stages of the creative process and seeks
to filter out poor ideas (Paletz & Schunn, 2010; Singh & Fleming, 2010). This convergent
process of product or idea evaluation in group settings involves social, political, and critical
assessment functions, as members “choose consciously or subconsciously to ignore ideas,
advocate for their own ideas, show enthusiasm for others’ ideas, and provide interpersonal
rewards for good ideas” and “reflects the iterative and integrated nature of idea evaluation at the
individual and organizational levels” (Rietzschel et al., 2006: 347). Organizations and
individuals that are best able to discern which ideas and products are highly creative will not
only produce the candidates that are most likely to be successful, but will also reduce the overall
cost and timeframe of development.
From a research perspective, measurement of creative output is critical to the validity of
experimental results. As noted above, various concerns have been raised about the evaluation of
creative output in research; in particular the possibility of measurement misspecification as a
result of differences between construct definitions and empirical measurement approaches
(Sullivan & Ford, 2010). After a review of published creativity research in top journals over a
10-year period, Sullivan & Ford (2010) noted that, despite the growing use of definitions
including both “novelty” and “usefulness” components, most creativity research studies continue
to measure creativity as a unitary construct that relies on a single dimension. Other authors have
suggested novelty and usefulness are associated with different organizational processes (Ford &
Gioia, 2000), may have different causes and consequences (Reiter-Palmon, Illies, Cross,
Buboltz, & Nimps, 2009), and may have distinct goals that can be represented as orthogonal
constructs (Litchfield, 2008). As a result, some researchers hypothesize the differences between
construct definitions and operational definitions in use may potentially create a misalignment
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that threatens statistical conclusion validity and could result in errors of inference (Sullivan &
Ford, 2010; Montag et al., 2012).
To test their hypotheses about possible measurement misspecification of prior creativity
research, Sullivan & Ford (2010) conducted two experiments to examine alternative
measurement models of creativity, comparing a one-factor measurement model with reflective
measures, against two-factor and three-factor composite latent models using novelty and
usefulness and novelty, usefulness, and ‘stylistic appeal', respectively, as formative indicators.
The results from both experiments suggest the two-factor composite latent construct model with
distinct formative indicators for novelty and usefulness provided the best fit of the participants’
assessments (Sullivan & Ford, 2010). However, the authors point out the measurement model
required by a specific study may depend on the nature of research and its theoretical approach,
and that in some circumstances a unidimensional or multiple-facet reflective indicator approach
may be more appropriate. The authors conclude by noting a significant limitation of their
research involved the use of students and professors to create and judge creative output,
suggesting future research should investigate “the relative weight of novelty and usefulness
assessments,” as well as “how other appropriate judges evaluate the creativity of stimulus items
in their domain” and “whether the depth or breadth of the judges’ domain expertise affects
creativity assessments” (Sullivan & Ford, 2010: 518). This research attempts to respond to the
authors’ three suggestions.
Other attempts to address the perceived insufficiency of the “novel and useful” construct
and operational definitions have generally involved the addition of a new facet or criterion. As
noted above, Sullivan & Ford (2010) included the criterion of “stylistic appeal” in their analysis
in light of research suggesting “style” as another aspect of creativity, but did not find sufficient
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support to unequivocally recommend adding that factor. Boden (2004) advocated three facets,
requiring a creative idea to be novel, valuable, and surprising, following Bruner’s (1962)
definition of creativity as involving an element of “effective surprise.” Simonton (2012) and
others have advocated that researchers adopt a definition similar to the three-part test utilized by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for patent applications, under which a
product or idea will only be awarded a patent if it is shown to be: 1) novel; 2) “non-obvious;”
and, 3) useful. Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code governs the Patentability of a
product or idea, which asserts:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Section 102 of Title 35 U.S.C. expands on the newness requirement of Section 101 by stating the
invention must exhibit “novelty,” which is defined as not having already been patented,
described in a publication, or otherwise in public use, for sale or available to the public. This
requirement is also described as the “prior art” exclusion and is designed to preclude obtaining a
patent by appropriating someone else’s previously published idea or publicly available product.
Section 103 adds the second criterion of “non-obvious subject matter”:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained…if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would
have been obvious … to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.
The “non-obviousness” criterion, or “surprise” in Simonton’s (2012) formulation,
similarly requires that a product or idea be sufficiently “above or beyond the current state of the
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art” such that is not simply an obvious extension of an existing idea or concept (Barton, 2003:
476). European patent regulations contain very similar requirements of novelty and usefulness,
but term the non-obviousness requirement as “inventiveness,” requiring that the product or idea
represent an “inventive step” or significant iteration in development either through the
combination of disparate ideas or departure from a normal development cycle (Barton, 2003).
Although some researchers have used a three-part criterion in the past, Simonton points out that
“few have followed their example” (Simonton, 2012: 98, fn, 1).
II.3.1 Consensual Assessment Technique
Most studies of creativity that involve the assessment of creative products or output rely
on external appraisals (Batey, 2012). The assessment of creative products by others initially
began as “aesthetic judgment” of the arts more than 100 years ago (Kaufman, Baer, Cropley,
Reiter-Palmon, & Sinnett, 2013). Amabile (1982) built on that historical approach in developing
the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT), which provides specific guidelines for measuring
the results and output of creative effort. Amabile’s consensual assessment technique is expressly
premised on a “product-based” operational definition of creativity:
A product or response is creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently
agree it is creative. Appropriate observers are those familiar with the domain in which
the product was created or the response articulated. (Amabile, 1982: 1001.)
Amabile’s CAT is unabashed in its reliance on knowledgeable individuals’ subjective and
intersubjective judgment of creative products, acknowledging the difficulty, if not near
impossibility (and perhaps the irrelevance), of attempting to assess creativity objectively
(Amabile, 1982, 1996). Moreover, CAT rests on two important assumptions: first, that given an
appropriate group of judges, it is possible to obtain reliable judgments of creativity; and second,
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that creativity exists on a continuum, i.e., some products and outcomes are more creative than
others are. This first assumption takes into account the fact that, while it is difficult to identify
specific features of a product that make it creative, people can recognize creativity when they see
it. Second, as a consensual technique, CAT assumes there are degrees of creativity and that
experts and individuals familiar with the domain can generally agree on the level of creativity of
a particular product (Amabile, 1982, 1996). The consensual assessment technique follows the
manner in which creativity is judged in many real-world situations in that it requires a group of
judges, usually domain experts, working independently and without specific instructions, to
make intersubjective assessments of creativity (Kaufman & Baer, 2012). As a result, CAT has
been called the “gold standard” of creative output measurement for research (Kaufman & Baer,
2012).
Recent research highlights the importance of expertise in judging creative output using
consensual assessment techniques and the stark differences between expert and novice ratings of
creativity. For example, Kaufman, Baer, Cole, and Sexton (2008) assessed the level of interrater
agreement among domain experts and college students who were asked to judge the creativity of
poems and short stories. Novices were found incomparable with experts in both cases. For
poetry, the correlation between experts and novices was only r = .22, and for short stories the
correlation was r = .71 (Kaufman et al., 2008; Kaufman, Baer & Cole, 2009). The expert judges
had very high levels of interrater reliability for both the poetry and short stories, with a
coefficient α of .83 and .92, respectively. For novices, interrater reliability was surprisingly also
very high, with a coefficient α of .94 for the poems and .93 for short stories. However, the very
high interrater reliabilities of the novices required using scores from 106 novice judges. When
any randomly selected group of 10 novice judge scores were analyzed, interrater reliability fell
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dramatically to just .58 for poetry and .53 for short stories. Even the moderate level of
agreement of r = .71 between novices and experts for short stories necessitated reliance on more
than 100 novices. As a result, the authors concluded novices could not be relied upon to produce
valid creativity judgments, and that the validity of CAT as a measurement tool in research
requires the use of domain experts as judges (Kaufman et al., 2013).
Contrary to the evidence showing that domain expert judges are necessary for the
consensual assessment technique to be considered reliable and valid, and that experts perform at
a much higher level as judges than novices, a review of published research suggests the vast
majority of creativity studies over the past 30 years utilizing CAT or similar consensual
techniques to assess creative outcomes have not used recognized domain experts as judges (see
Appendix 7.2, Summary of Published Creativity Research). The review reveals that a high
preponderance of studies (37 of 41) used college students, research assistants, university
professors, or study researchers to judge the creative outcomes produced by study participants.
The use of non-expert judges to assess creative outcomes—where CAT necessitates expert
judges for reliability and validity—raises questions about the soundness of those research results,
as well as the appropriateness of the criteria and processes used to evaluate creativity in those
studies (Sullivan & Ford, 2010). However, how experts actually judge creativity in practice is
not well understood.
II.4 Experts and Expertise-Based Intuition
Psychologists have studied expertise for over a century in an attempt to understand how
experts acquire and use knowledge, particularly studying the differences in mental functioning
between experts and novices (Andre & Gobet, 2008). Current research on expertise suggests that
two major phenomena constitute the foundation of cognitive expertise—visual perception and
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knowledge organization. Visual perception plays a major role in evoking knowledge (Henderson
& Hollingworth, 1999) and, because expert knowledge is fundamentally different from that of
novices, the study of cognitive expertise cannot be separated from the study of perception—
experts literally “see” their domain differently than novices (Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, &
Stampe, 2001). Experts are also fundamentally different from novices in the way they acquire,
manage, and organize domain knowledge (Andre & Gobet, 2008). While experts have not been
shown to possess greater memory or computational capacity than others with similar intelligence
(Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Ericsson, 2014; but see Grabner, 2014), the manner in which they
develop and reorganize information sets them apart from novices of similar general abilities
(Chase & Simon, 1973).
Expert knowledge is thought to be organized in two ways, as “chunks” or “scripts” at a
low level of abstraction, and in more schematic and abstract elements or “templates” which can
be adapted readily to a larger range of situations in higher levels (Andre & Gobet, 2008).
Experts use these chunks and templates to situate problems or challenges within groups of past
experiences from long-term memory, allowing the expert to extrapolate or anticipate next steps,
the way an expert chess player can both “see” the entire chess board and simultaneously imagine
most if not all of the next possible moves available (Gobet & Simon, 1996). Obtaining the
requisite knowledge and schemas to become an expert requires a considerable number of years
of direct experience and “deliberate practice” (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993).
Interest in the effectiveness of intuition in judgment and decision-making has also grown
in recent years as scholars have begun to accept the concept, particularly with regard to expert
use of intuition. Several researchers have suggested that expert intuition might be an effective
way to manage the difficult trade-off between decision accuracy and speed (Dane & Pratt, 2007).
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In psychology, intuition is generally accepted to arise from one of two information-processing
systems that operate within the brain (Epstein, 2003). Under this dual-process model, decision
making is hypothesized as either the product of primal, automatic, associative and experiential
“System 1” processing, or the result of rational, intentional, deliberate, and extensional “System
2” processing (Epstein, 2003; Kahneman, 2003, 2011). Intuition is thought to arise from the
faster, associative, and “nonconscious” information processing of System 1 (Epstein 2003;
Kahneman 2003, 2011).
In management literature drawing upon dual-process models, the construct of intuition
consists of four characteristics: “Intuition is a (1) nonconscious process (2) involving holistic
associations (3) that are produced rapidly, which (4) result in affectively charged judgments”
(Dane & Pratt 2007: 36). The process of “intuiting” is rapid (often instantaneous), spontaneous
(without effort and unable to be controlled) and alogical (not necessarily contradicting the rules
of logic but may not follow them either) (Dorfler & Ackermann, 2012).
Intuiting has been theorized to involve matching environmental stimuli or a nonalgorithmic task with nonconscious patterns, schemas, or cues (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Klein, 1998)
or linking or associating disparate elements of information (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier,
1996). However, a significant body of research shows intuition is ineffective in decision-making
involving algorithmic tasks that can be decomposed and solved logically, sequentially, or
mathematically (Dane, Rockmann & Pratt, 2012). In fact, research has repeatedly shown that
reliance on intuition in decision-making that involves decomposable tasks, mathematical
calculations, or following a sequence of rules is likely to produce gross misjudgments (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2003). In their research on “heuristics and biases,” Kahneman
and Tversky define intuition as “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without
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much reflection” (Kahneman 2003: 449). The results of heuristics and biases research
highlighted the insufficiency and errors that arise from the use of any of three “intuitive”
heuristics in decisions made in algorithmic tasks such as estimating the population of a city or
choosing between limited alternatives presented: (1) the representativeness heuristic (i.e. “what
is typical”); (2) the availability heuristic (i.e. “what comes easily to mind”); (3) adjustment and
anchoring (i.e. “what happens to come first”) (Kahneman 2003, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
However, other research suggests intuition may be much more effective and significantly
less error-prone than analysis in cases of non-algorithmic and non-decomposable tasks
(Hammond et al., 1987). Examples of non-decomposable tasks theorized to be more amenable
to intuitive decision-making include judgments about artwork, the taste of food, and the morality
of behavior (Dane et al., 2012; Haidt, 2001). Research into expertise-based intuition has focused
on how experts recognize and retrieve large “chunks” of information, and use patterns or
schemas stored in long-term memory without conscious effort when dealing with nonalgorithmic situations (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Studies of the effective use of expert intuition
indicate greater time pressure will cause an individual to rely more on intuition than analysis, and
that experts possess highly sophisticated, nonconscious cognitive structures that afford rapid and
accurate retrieval of information and creation of appropriate responses in time-critical situations
(Klein, 1998; Simon & Chase, 1973; Dane & Pratt, 2007). However, research has also shown
that not all expertise is the same, and expertise in one domain does not easily transfer to another
(Kahneman, 2011).
As a result of these studies, intuitive judgments and decisions by domain experts at a very
high level of expertise, variously called “intuition-as-expertise” (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004),
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“intuitive expertise” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), and “expertise-based intuition” (Salas, Rosen,
and Diaz-Granados, 2010), are theorized to be highly trustworthy, fast, and effective (Dane &
Pratt, 2007).
The distinctive earmarks of intuition are rapid response (a matter of seconds) and
inability of the respondent to report a sequence of steps leading to the result—even denial
of awareness of such steps . . . what impresses observers about intuition is that responses,
especially those of experts, are frequently correct even though they seem to have required
almost no processing time or effort” (March & Simon, 1993: 11).
Researchers have also concluded the most effective intuitive judgments are those of domain
experts who have had the opportunity to acquire domain specific information and who have
received critical feedback and cues from a high validity environment (Kahneman & Klein,
2009), and where the effectiveness of intuition relative to analysis is amplified by higher levels
of domain expertise (Dane et al., 2012; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Salas, et al., 2010).
II.5 Judgment and Decision Making (JDM)
For this research, understanding how experts use intuitive expertise to judge creative
outcomes suggested application of two competing theories of judgment and decision-making.
The two theories, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and Cognitive Continuum Theory
(CCT), were applied in this study using Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) models and
techniques. An in-depth review of the literature on CEST and CCT helped shape the research
conducted using NDM, and a summary of the literature is provided below.
II.5.1 Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) is a dual-process theory of human
information processing integrating theories of learning, cognition, personality, and the self
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(Epstein, 2003; Norris & Epstein, 2011). CEST assumes the human brain consists of two
complimentary but independent systems of information processing: an “experiential (i.e.,
intuitive) system” and a “rational (i.e., analytical) system” (Epstein et al., 1996). The
experiential or intuitive system, sometimes referred to as System 1, is preconscious, fast,
nonverbal and holistic, and is considered a product of human evolution operating automatically
under principles of associative learning that solves problems through adaptation by reacting
according to its experience and reinforcement history (Norris & Epstein, 2011). In contrast, the
rational or analytical system, System 2, is a conscious, slow, affect-free, verbal reasoning system
that is engaged deliberately to process information logically and solve problems through
evaluation of evidence and alternatives (Norris & Epstein, 2011).
CEST posits the two processing systems often work in parallel and interact as necessary
to contribute to a person’s behavior and conscious thought (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012).
Because the experiential system is fast, requires little in cognitive resources, and is guided by
prior experiences, it is particularly adept at handling the vast majority of information processing
that occurs outside of conscious awareness on a daily basis (Epstein, 2003). This default to
System 1 processing is thought to preserve cognitive resources and conscious deliberation for
more abstract, logical, and challenging cognitive processing. The two systems are also presumed
to respond differently to stimuli and use different cognitive resources. For example, when faced
with an emotionally significant event, CEST predicts the experiential system will automatically
search long-term memory stores for related “experiences” and emotional accompaniments that
create an intuitive response (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2013). The rational system, on the other
hand, is inferential, and operates through reason, abstract thought, and the use of language.
Because of these criteria, the rational system requires more cognitive resources and has limited
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processing capacity. Unlike the experiential system, the rational system is self-aware and has
capacity to understand and decide whether to accept or reject influence from the experiential
system. The rational system theoretically operates without emotion and can be changed through
appeals to logic and reason (Epstein, 2003). As a result, even when operating under guidance
from the experiential system, individuals are capable of discounting System 1 influence by
consciously deciding to do so (Epstein et al., 1996). The theorized characteristics of System 1
and System 2 are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Characteristics of Experiential-System 1 and Rational-System 2 (from Epstein, et
al. 1996)
System 1 (experiential / intuitive)

System 2 (analytical / reflective)

Holistic
Automatic
Emotional
Mediates behavior by “feel”
Fast for immediate action

Analytic
Intentional
Logical
Mediates behavior by conscious
appraisal
Slow for delayed action

Resistant to change
Preconscious

Easily changed through reason
Conscious

According to CEST, the experiential and rational systems tend to work independently but
in tandem, “toggling” sequentially as needed, and affect one another depending on the nature of
the stimulus (Epstein, 2003). Each system has its own unique adaptations, advantages, and
disadvantages that tend to direct the order of operation of the two systems and the ultimate
behavioral response. The experiential system adapts through implicit learning by experience,
whereas the rational system adjusts through logical inference and explicit learning (Epstein
2003).
In operation, CEST predicts that when confronted with an event, the experiential system
responds quickly and non-consciously by making automatic associations to similar past events or
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experiences, eliciting a holistic emotional response or “vibe,” which then directs further
processing (Epstein, 2003). The slower, more analytic rational system subsequently attempts to
understand or “rationalize” the initial emotional response and logically analyzes behavior before
selecting the most emotionally satisfying and intellectually appropriate explanation for that
behavior. “Such rationalization is a routine process that occurs far more often than is generally
recognized,” and the influences of the experiential system on the rational system are attributed
by CEST “as major sources of human irrationality” (Epstein, 2003: 162). This may be because
the experiential system is fast and its automatic emotional response is able to bias subsequent
processing in the rational system outside of an individual’s conscious awareness (Norris &
Epstein, 2011). Likewise, the rational system has the ability, through conscious thought and
deliberation, to correct the experiential system and teach it through repetition of thoughts and
behaviors to adapt to new situations (Epstein 2003). However, the experiential system is thought
to be much more efficient, able to manage greater amounts of information, and for that reason,
tends to be the default processing system in daily life. “The rational system is capable of high
levels of abstract reasoning and is therefore the source of humankind’s unique accomplishments,
but it is too effortful to efficiently direct most behavior in everyday life” (Norris & Epstein,
2011: 1044).
While dual-process theories, such as CEST, posit \ the two modes of cognition are often in
direct conflict, each operating independently at different times, dual-process theories provide
few, if any, specifics about how the two systems or modes interact or the nature of their
relationship (Dhami & Thompson, 2012). This “either-or” approach to cognition as being either
purely analytic or purely intuitive potentially creates a false dichotomy that has been challenged
by competing views seeking to integrate analysis and intuition into a single theoretical
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framework (Dhami & Thompson, 2012). However, recent studies of human brain functioning
and mental processing using fMRI suggest cognition may actually operate in the manner
predicted by dual-process theories. Researchers conducted fMRI studies of individuals during
tasks designed to engage the two different brain networks: the task-negative or default mode
network that operates outside of conscious attention (System 1), and the task-positive network
that manages attention-demanding cognitive tasks (System 2) (Jack, et al, 2014). Results of
analyzing brain scans of the subjects while engaged in the two types of tasks revealed that social
tasks deactivated regions associated with mechanical reasoning, while mechanical tasks
deactivated regions of the brain associated with social reasoning. The researchers concluded a
physiological constraint on human processing might prevent both networks from acting
simultaneously (Jack, et al, 2014).
II.5.2 Cognitive Continuum Theory
In contrast to CEST and other dual process models, Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT)
views different modes of cognition in decision making along a continuum, with intuition at one
end and analysis at the other, and explains the interaction between different cognitive modes
during a decision-making task (Dhami & Thompson, 2012). CCT, founded on social judgment
theory and Brunswickian principles of functionalism, argues that cognitive processes and
performance should be described and measured relative to the environment in which they
function (Dhami, Hertwig and Hoffrage, 2004). Recognizing the benefits of both analysis and
intuition, as well as the limitations of each to high-fidelity decision making, Brunswick
introduced the concept of “quasirationality” as cognition that occurs when intuition and analysis
are simulataneously present to some degree (Dhami & Thompson, 2012).
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According to CCT, most decision making involves a combination of intuition and
analysis, with cognitive tasks arranged along a continuum in terms of the task’s tendency to
induce intuition, quasirationality, or analysis. When performing a task, individuals move along
the continuum in response to the properties of the task (Dhami & Thompson, 2012). CCT
predicts initial task success will inhibit movement along the continuum, or preclude a change in
cognitive mode, while initial task failure will stimulate movement and search along the
continuum, potentially causing oscillation between the two modes until a decision is reached
(Dhami & Thompson, 2012). CCT also predicts decision performance is contingent on
correspondence between task properties and individual cognitive mode or abilities (Dhami &
Thompson, 2012; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia & Pearson, 1987).
The different modes of cognition along the continuum are identified by unique sets of
properties defining either intuition or analysis (Doherty & Kurz, 1996). Some of these defining
properties and resulting impacts on processing are outlined in Table 2 below.
Table 2 Defining properties of intuition and analysis (from Dhami & Thompson, 2012)
Property

Intuition

Analysis

Consistency / reliability of
judgments or cognitive control
Awareness of cognitive activity
Speed of cognitive activity
Memory
Metaphors used
Information use
Confidence in judgments
Errors in judgment

Low

High

Low
High
Little encoding
Pictorial, qualitative
Flexible
Low
Many, but small and
normally distributed

High
Low
Complex encoding
Verbal, quantitative
Consistent
High
Few, but large and nonnormally distributed

Quasirationality is defined as when any combination of these properties of intuition and analysis
are used in judgment and exists along the continuum between the two polar extremes (Dhami &
Thompson, 2012). In practice, quasirationality is thought to be the most prevalent mode of
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cognition, such that “it is rare for any task to involve pure intuition or pure analysis” (Dhami &
Thompson, 2012: 320).
Cognitive tasks along the continuum that are expected to induce either intuition or
analysis can also be differentiated by their respective task properties, as shown in Table 3 below.
The number, nature, and degree of task properties present dictate the cognitive mode that will be
induced. Depending on the nature of the task, intermediate levels or a combination of properties
that separately induce intuition and analysis will likely result in quasirationality (Dhami &
Thompson, 2012).
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Table 3 Properties of tasks that induce intuition and analysis (from Dhami & Thompson,
2012)
Task Properties

Intuition

Analysis

Familiarity with task

Familiar

Unfamiliar

Prior training / knowledge of

None

Some

> 5 pieces of

< 5 pieces of information

task
Amount of information

information
Information presentation order

Simultaneous

Sequential

Information presentation format

Pictorial

Quantitative

Inter-relation of information

Redundancy

Independent

Interpretation of information

Subjectively

Objectively

Number of response options

Many

Few

Time pressure

High

Low

Feedback available

Little / none

Cognitive feedback

Outcome knowledge

Available

Unavailable

Many of the defining properties of intuition and analysis, and the properties of the tasks likely to
induce intuition, analysis, or quasirationality, have been supported by studies testing cognitive
control (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000), linearity of organizing
principles (Hammond et al., 1987), and distribution of errors (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond,
et al., 1987). Confidence in the decision-making process has been shown to be higher than
confidence in the actual judgment with analytic cognition, whereas confidence in method is
lower than in the ultimate outcome with intuition (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond et al.,
1987).
There is also some evidence supporting CCT’s prediction that different task properties
induce different modes of cognition, particularly with regard to the number of cues, redundancy
among cues, cue weights, availability of organizing principles and degree of non-linearity of
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organization (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hamm, 1988; Hammond et al., 1987). Cognitive mode has
been shown to shift during a task depending on the perceived difficulty of the task and is
dependent upon the tendency of the task to induce intuition (Hamm, 1988). Lastly, Hammond,
et al. (1987) found empirical evidence to support CCT’s prediction that achievement is
dependent upon correspondence between task properties and the cognitive mode employed
(Hammond et al., 1987; see also Dunwoody et al., 2000). Research also lends indirect support to
many other assumptions of CCT about how task properties alter the mode of cognition listed in
Table 2, including the ways experts use intuitive processing, the amount of information these
individuals are able to cognitively process, and how high time pressure leads to use of more
intuitive strategies (Dhami & Thompson, 2012).
Cognitive Continuum Theory has been used in several different research contexts to
examine expert judgment, including management (Mahan, 1994), nursing (Cader, Campbell &
Watson, 2005; Standing, 2008), engineering (Hammond et al., 1987), clinical decision making
(Hamm, 1988), and retail products (Mathwicka, Malthotrab, & Rigdon, 2002). For example,
Mahan (1994) applied CCT in a management context to examine the effects of task duration and
task uncertainty on decision performance. Mahan found that stressors, such as short task
duration and task uncertainty, induced a shift toward intuition but also resulted in a decrease in
decision performance (Mahan, 1994).
II.5.3 Application of CEST and CCT using Naturalistic Decision Making
Most of the research applying CEST and CCT has involved experimental studies in
laboratory conditions. The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) framework provides a method
for applying CEST and CCT to understand how experts make decisions in cognitively
challenging field settings. NDM arose from a need to take decision making out of the laboratory
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and understand how decisions are made in the real world (Klein, 1997). The NDM framework is
a descriptive model that focuses on cognitive functions of decision making in the field,
particularly emphasizing situational awareness, recognition primed decisions, and sensemaking
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 2001).
One of the hallmarks of NDM is the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model. RPD
describes how people use past experiences and knowledge to develop and recognize cues,
patterns, and relationships to make decisions quickly and effectively. The RPD model was
developed using cognitive task analysis to understand how experienced fireground commanders
make appropriate and effective decisions under conditions of extreme time pressure, high stakes,
and uncertainty (Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989; Lipshitz et al., 2001). Klein and
colleagues hypothesized that fireground commanders, faced with extreme time pressure, would
not be able to generate and select from a large number of decision options as predicted by
models of rational decision making. Instead, it was anticipated that fireground commanders
would be restricted to choosing between just two options, a favored decision and a comparison
(Klein et al., 1989). However, after conducting in-depth interviews of experienced firefighters
about their experiences with 156 highly challenging fireground incidents, researchers discovered
the firefighters were not comparing any options; instead, they were generally following the very
first course of action identified. This finding raised two questions: (1) how could the fire
commanders effectively rely on the first option identified, and (2) how could they evaluate a
single option without comparing it to any others? (Lipshitz et al. 2001).
In seeking answers to these questions, the fireground commander interviews lead
researchers to identify three variations of the Recognition-Primed Decision model. In the first
variation, a skilled decision maker sizes up the situation and develops a feasible course of action
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using prototypes based on experience (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This variant works best in
relatively straightforward situations under short time constraints. In the second variation, most
often used when a situation is unclear or ambiguous, the skilled decision maker relies on a storybuilding strategy to mentally simulate the events leading up to the observed features of the
situation, gauging the status of the situation to develop a feasible course of action based on the
mental simulation (Pennington & Hastie, 1995). The third variation describes how fireground
commanders are able to evaluate a course of action without comparing it to other options. Here,
commanders develop and evaluate the first feasible course of action through mental simulations
to determine whether the strategy might work and look for potential unintended consequences.
The course of action then can be modified and re-simulated if it lacks “progressive deepening”
until an acceptable choice is identified (Lipshitz et al., 2001).
All three variations of RPD rely heavily on the domain expertise and experience of the
decision maker, and domain expertise greatly enhances the speed and quality of judgments. In
the first variant of RPD, expertise provides the prototypes the decision maker uses to quickly
categorize the situation and recognize a possible course of action. In the second and third
variants, expertise is used to develop the stories, mental models, and simulations required to
imagine the events leading up to the situation, develop a feasible course of action, and simulate
and test the possible outcomes if that course of action is taken (Lipshitz et al., 2001). Expertise
in the RPD model also allows decision makers to respond quickly to changing conditions and illdefined goals because RPD focuses on working forward from existing conditions: “Therefore,
the RPD model is a blend of intuition and analysis. The pattern matching is the intuitive part, and
the mental simulation is the conscious, deliberate, and analytical part.” (Klein, 2008: 458).
Research has also shown that experts are more likely to use “forward-chain reasoning,”
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whereas novices and non-experts tend to rely on “backward-chain reasoning” (Patel & Groen,
1986). Forward-chain reasoning involves taking the known or assumed aspects of an event or
series of events and imagining next steps and ultimate conclusions. Forward chaining requires
significant experience and understanding of the possible consequences of action or non-action
and the ability to discover missing elements. Forward chaining involves “If-Then” reasoning
where “If” is the known and “Then” relates to the inferred effects. Backward-chain reasoning,
on the other hand, involves starting from a known result or consequence and developing
hypotheses about causation and linkages to see if necessary conditions are met to achieve the
desired outcome (Mess, 1995; Darden 2002).
The three variations of RPD show how expert decision makers can be effective in the
face of uncertainty, time pressure, shifting conditions, and ill-defined goals without developing
and comparing multiple choices or following a rational choice approach (Lipshitz et al., 2001).
These findings have been replicated by research of experts in various military, design
engineering, offshore oil industry, commercial aviation, and medical settings (see Klein, 1998 for
a review). However, this additional research also suggests several boundary conditions: RPD
tends to apply in situations where the decision maker has sufficient relevant domain experience
and expertise, is under significant time pressure, and where ill-defined goals produce uncertainty.
RPD is less effective in situations presenting highly combinatorial or algorithmic problems,
where justifications are required, or in cases where differing views of multiple stakeholders must
be considered (Klein, 1998).
As a descriptive model, NDM uses a variety of field observation techniques to understand
real-world decision making within the context of the task environment to gain insight into
sources of difficulty, error, non-optimal performance, and how larger systems support or inhibit
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decision makers in practice (Lipshitz et al., 2001). NDM methods used for eliciting decisionmaking strategies and expert knowledge include: structured and unstructured interviews, critical
incident analysis, domain and concept maps, think-aloud protocols, simulations, and real-time
observation or review of recorded decision-making behaviors (Klein et al., 1989; Lipshitz et al.,
2001). One of the key techniques of NDM is cognitive task analysis (CTA), a broad term that
encompasses multiple methods for capturing experts’ and practitioners’ knowledge and
processes in performing their jobs (Klein et al., 1989; Lipshitz et al., 2001). CTA and related
techniques have been shown to provide reliable and valid results in a number of different studies
(see Hoffman et al., 1998, for review).
For the purposes of this research, NDM was used as the framework for investigating how
creativity domain experts make judgments of creative output “in the wild” (Lipshitz et al., 2001:
346). Expert judgment (assessment and evaluation) of creativity occurs in numerous real-world
settings including education (e.g., art, design, creative writing), the workplace (e.g., graphic
design, advertising, marketing, architecture, engineering), and society (e.g., museums, film,
music, photography). CEST and CCT suggest experts may use many different approaches,
techniques, and strategies in decision making, depending on the nature of the task and the
surrounding environment. NDM lends a methodology to help uncover and understand the
processes, cues, cognitive schemas and approaches that creative experts use when deciding if a
product or idea is indeed creative.
Accordingly, this study utilized Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA), a streamlined
version of cognitive task analysis developed for researchers untrained in cognitive psychology
(Militello & Hutton, 1998; Crandell, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006). ACTA provides a refined set of
cognitive task analysis techniques specifically designed to identify the key cognitive elements
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required to perform mentally challenging or complex tasks (McAndrew & Gore, 2013). Because
ACTA focuses on the key cognitive elements underlying difficult judgments and decisions,
critical cues and patterns and problem-solving strategies, it is particularly well suited to studying
expert decision making (McAndrew & Gore, 2013). A more complete description of how ACTA
was used in this study is provided at Appendix 7.1
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III METHODOLOGY
III.1 Introduction and Overview
The purpose of this multi-case field study was to investigate the processes and measures
that expert judges use in assessing the output creativity of individuals who regularly generate
products and ideas for industry. Understanding how individual domain experts make judgments
about the creativity of products and ideas under extreme time pressure, uncertainty, and
ambiguity is expected to provide useful insights into the criteria, weightings, key elements, and
biases involved in judging creative output. These insights are also anticipated to advance
understanding of the challenges creativity researchers face in assessing creative output, and to
suggest methods and practices that will improve the measurement, reliability, and validity of this
area of research.
To better understand this phenomenon, this study investigates how domain experts judge
the creativity of entries in professional awards programs through the following specific research
questions:
1. What criteria do expert judges of creativity awards contests report using to assess the
creativity of products and ideas; in particular, do experts use the “novel and useful” definition of
creativity that is employed in most creativity research or some other criteria?
2. What processes do experts use as they judge creativity in contest settings; are the
processes involved in creativity contests similar to or different from those used in the experts’
professional workplace settings?
3. What types of cognitive processing are involved in expert judgment of creative products
and ideas; do experts use intuition, rational analysis, a combination of both, or something else
when judging creativity contests?
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4. What do experts say are the differences between how experts and non-experts make
judgments of creativity; what kinds of mistakes might a novice make in judging creativity?
5. What biases and heuristics do expert judges acknowledge encountering when judging
creativity in real-world situations, and how do they attempt to deal with them?
This chapter describes the study’s methodological approach and explains: (1) the rationale for
the research approach; (2) a description of the research participants; (3) a summary of the
information required for the research; (4) an overview of the research design; (5) the methods
used for data collection; (6) the methods used to analyze and synthesize the data; (7) ethical
concerns; (8) issues of trustworthiness; and (9) limitations and delimitations of the study.
III.2 Rationale for the Research Approach
III.2.1 Rationale for a qualitative field study approach
This research investigated how domain experts make real-world judgments about the
creativity of products and ideas. As such, it involved a process study of the steps, procedures,
and actions judges take in evaluating creative output, and a cognitive behavioral study of the
criteria, cues, and mental processing that expert judges use to form judgments. The focus of the
research was on “how” particular individuals understood, experienced, and applied certain social
constructs, and “what” information and approaches those individuals relied upon to make
decisions in a social environment. Accordingly, a qualitative research approach was determined
to be most appropriate for this field study.
Qualitative research is concerned with the social complexities of the real world in a
particular context, over a specific period of time, and the ways in which participants make sense
of the world around them (Merriam, 2009). As such, it derives from a constructivist
epistemology that contends knowledge is a human and social construction based on
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interpretations of available information (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Qualitative research involves
researcher participation to investigate social situations and interactions in an effort to achieve a
more holistic understanding of the events, participants, and environments (Denzin & Lincoln,
2011). In contrast to quantitative analysis, which is more concerned with the relationships
between variables, measurement of objectively verifiable data, and testing of hypotheses,
qualitative research is a naturalist approach that seeks to extract and interpret the meaning of
events as they are experienced and understood by individuals (Merriam, 2009). While
quantitative research assumes a post-positivist view that an approximation of reality can be
observed and described using evidence-based probabilities, qualitative research is based on an
interpretivist perspective, wherein there are multiple versions of reality, requiring deeper inquiry
of shared meaning from various sources (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). In this respect, “modeldependent realism” argues there is no observer-independent concept of the world and reality:
Model-dependent realism is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from
our sensory organs by making a model of the world. When such a model is successful
at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that
constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth…According to model-dependent
realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with
observation. If there are two models that both agree with observation…then one
cannot say that one is more real than another. (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010: 7 & 46).
III.2.2 Rationale for a case study approach
This field study was designed to understand “how” judgment and decision making occurs
in a particular context, and as such, it was necessary to examine contemporary events that the
researcher could not manipulate or modify by intervention. The information sought in this
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research related to the actions, mental processes, choices and biases of individuals engaged in
one particular complex activity. Thus, a case study approach was chosen as the most likely to
yield the desired level of detail and understanding (Yin, 2009). Case studies maximize face
validity by incorporating a contemporary problem that other researchers or organizations identify
with, which allows the researcher to explore challenging questions in the context of complex and
uncertain situations. However, case studies are also susceptible to potential disadvantages,
including difficulty accessing participants and data, lack of control over the context, and
significant time investments (Myers, 2009).
The study sought to investigate judgment and decision making at an individual unit of
analysis by observing, interviewing, and learning from individual domain experts. As Myers
(2009) explains, qualitative research aims to understand decisions and action in context by seeing
and talking with people who are or who have engaged in the actions and events of interest. To
increase the relevance of this study to practice, a pluralistic methodology of engaged scholarship
was used (Van de Ven, 2007), which involved the participation of business stakeholders to
uncover the complex, real-world problems they routinely face (Van de Ven, 2007). The study
included perspectives and feedback from key stakeholders and participants in creative industries,
such as domain experts, experienced judges, creativity awards program operators, managers of
creative employees, and experienced creative employees throughout the research process.
Following an engaged scholarship approach, this research study adopted the seven principles
recommended by Klein and Myers (1999) for conducting interpretive field studies: (1) the
fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle (“understanding is achieved by iterating between
the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole they form”); (2) contextualization (“critical
reflection of the social and historical background of the research setting”); (3) interaction
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between researcher and subjects (critical reflection of how the data obtained were socially
constructed); (4) abstraction and generalization (relating the data and observation to theory); (5)
dialogical reasoning (awareness of possible contradictions between theoretical preconceptions
and actual findings); (6) multiple interpretations (possibility of differences in participants’
interpretations); and, (7) suspicion (awareness of participants’ possible of biases and “distortion
of events”) (Klein & Myers, 1999). These principles are not all mandatory or required to be used
in a particular order—researchers are expected to use their judgment and discretion in deciding
how and when various principles should be applied while keeping in mind the principles are
somewhat interdependent (Klein & Myers, 1999).
III.3 Research Setting and Context
This study is situated in a field setting to understand how individuals make judgments of
creative products and ideas in the real world. In an effort to explain how judgments are made at
a very high level, the inquiry focused on individuals with substantial domain experience in
creative industries that were recognized as experts by their peers. In addition, it was important
that study participants possess a significant level of past experience in making judgments about
creative products and ideas, both in workplace settings and in situations involving time pressure,
high stakes, and uncertainty.
Creativity award program judges are selected because their peers have recognized them as
creative industry experts, and because they have received awards for their creative work in the
past. These judges are also usually managers or directors in highly creative marketing,
advertising, graphic design, photography, product design and packaging, architecture, and
research and development industries. As such, they have experience evaluating creative products
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and ideas at each step of the creative process in their capacities at work and in contests under
stress, ambiguity, and time constraints.
After investigating of a number of creativity award programs, one program on the U.S.
East Coast was selected as most appropriate for this study. All of the judges involved in the
selected awards program were previous winners of multiple creativity awards, had more than 15
years professional experience in a creative industry, and were nominated as judges by other
professionals. The awards program’s primary purpose was recognizing and awarding
“creativity” in a large number of professional fields, in contrast to many other programs where
creativity comes second to other content areas, such as “advertising.” The judges chosen for this
program came from diverse backgrounds, industries, and major metropolitan cities in the United
States, Mexico, Italy, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, China, Singapore, and
Spain. The awards program was also chosen because it is one of few that requires judges to be
physically present to score items simultaneously in a large venue over several days, instead of
viewing entries either via webpages or on a computer file. These conditions provided the judges
the advantage of handling each item personally, interacting with other judges, and evaluating at
their own pace, but also created a field condition of significant stress, compressed time
constraints, uncertainty, and high stakes that are key elements for understanding how experts
assess creativity. The setting also allowed the researcher to examine judges during actual contest
conditions, and conduct simulations and think-aloud exercises with contest entries.
III.3.1 Overview of information needed
Obtaining information from diverse sources was considered important to investigate how
expert judges assess creativity in field settings. To understand the tasks and cognitive challenges
judges might face, it was critical to interview judges with a very high level of experience in a
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creative domain, but also to observe them in actual field conditions. Furthermore, while semistructured interviews provided valuable insight into participants’ subconscious awareness of their
actions, it was necessary to use a form of cognitive task analysis that involved simulation
exercises and think-aloud protocols. Collateral written materials from the awards program, as
well as interviews of the operators of the contest, were obtained to provide context about the
judging event. Lastly, data from the judges’ entry scores from this contest and from previous
award contests over a five-year period were obtained in order to evaluate the inter-rater
agreement among these expert judges.
III.4 Research Participants and Data Sources
III.4.1 Pilot Study
This study was inspired by challenges the researcher encountered in his professional
experience as an executive at an architecture and design organization, as well feedback of other
business executives about the difficulty of identifying highly creative work. These challenges
also inspired the researcher and two colleagues to conduct an unpublished student research study
examining the impact of rewards and task description on employee motivation and creative
outcomes. As part of that initial study, the research team interviewed managers of several
different organizations, each with more than 10 years of experience supervising creative
employees and producing creative ideas and products themselves.
Using the information obtained through the interviews, a pilot study that featured a logo
design contest for a charity organization was developed. Freelance graphic designers were asked
to design a logo for a specified charity, and 36 different logo designs were submitted. Three
independent graphics professionals scored the submissions separately based on the criteria of
“novelty” and “usefulness,” each on a scale of 1 to 5. During the scoring process, two of the
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professionals residing in the U.S. scored one particular entry as highly novel and also very
useful. However, the third professional, based in the U.K., scored the same entry as a 1 on both
novelty and usefulness. When the third professional was asked why he scored the entry so low,
he indicated the logo design appeared to be a very close replica of a finalist logo for the 2012
London Olympics. When the other two judges were asked about their scores on the same item,
they revealed they had not seen the finalists for the London Olympics logo. To the U.S. judges,
the entry appeared to be unique and to be a good fit with the charity’s mission. This raised the
issue of whether the criteria of “novelty” and “usefulness” are good measures of creativity where
the full domain of existing art cannot be known by any one evaluator, and how (and in fact
whether) these two criteria are assessed in real world settings.
The pilot study uncovered numerous other practical and theoretical challenges
surrounding the discernment of creative outcomes in professional settings and academic
research. Of particular note was the lack of understanding about how the creativity of
professional work product is identified and measured, how those who assess creativity go about
the critical task of selecting the most creative ideas and products, and the factors and criteria
judges actually use to identify highly creative outcomes. These practical and theoretical
questions contributed to development of the research questions for this study.
III.4.2 Criteria for Research Participants
To better understand the processes and cognition experts use when evaluating creativity,
this study sought to identify research participants who were recognized by their peers as domain
experts in various creative endeavors and industries. Of particular interest were individuals with
more than a decade of substantial experience in creative industries who also had significant
experience assessing creativity in professional settings and in judging creativity awards
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programs. Numerous studies have shown that superior expertise is developed through repeated
effort and diligent practice over a significant number of years in a specific domain environment
that offers regular feedback and opportunity for learning (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer,
1993). In professional settings, experts are recognized by others in the industry through their
years of experience, professional commitment, and dedicated practice, and as a result are often
selected by their peers to acts as mentors, judges, managers, leaders, and educators.
Awards programs that recognize highly creative work in fields such as graphic design,
advertising, and product development utilize such peer-recognized industry experts as contest
judges to choose winners and increase the overall credibility of award selection. Judges for these
types of awards programs are considered among the very best in their field and have often
received numerous awards for their own work in previous contests. Thus, recognized industry
experts who have judged award programs specifically focused on creativity and creative
professions are anticipated to have established the level and type of experience this study seeks
to understand.
III.4.3 Participant Selection
For this study, criterion-based and purposive selection methodologies were used to
identify and select research participants with the requisite professional experience, skill, and
expertise (Patton, 1990; Merriam, 2009). Purposive sampling allows for a selection of
information-rich cases at the heart of the research investigation. Criterion-based methods require
that all participants meet one or more criteria predetermined by the researcher, and that they have
extensive experience in the identified phenomena to be investigated, in an effort to reduce
variation (Patton, 1990). Internet research revealed more than a dozen different national and
international award programs in various creative industries operating within the United States
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between 2010 and 2015. This list was narrowed to four whose primary missions were to
recognize and award highly creative work of professionals across a broad range of categories that
also utilized recognized industry experts as contest judges. Specialty and niche award programs
were excluded from further consideration if they focused on only one or a few categories within
a defined creative industry. Also excluded from the list were those that did not identify
creativity as a specific award criteria, those focused on technical innovations, and those that were
aimed mainly at recognizing other aspects of professional work, such as overall financial
performance or advertising effectiveness (e.g., the “Effie Awards”, see www.effie.org). Award
programs also were excluded if all of the judges or the jury for the program did not appear to be
industry experts or otherwise have significant direct professional experience in the domain that
was evaluated (e.g., general interest publication awards that utilized writers and editors from the
publication as judges for technical product and other non-writing awards).
Program directors or lead judges of the four remaining creative industry award programs
were contacted by email using information listed on the websites for each contest. All four
identified program posted the identities of the judges from the most recent contest as well as the
identity and contact information for the program director or judge in charge. An introductory
email was sent to each of the four programs identifying the nature of the proposed research and
inquiring about interviewing their program’s judges. Follow-up emails were sent if a response
had not been received within a week of initial contact. After two weeks, program directors from
two of the four contests had responded to the inquiry, and both offered to discuss the research.
After discussing the proposed research by phone, one of the two programs was selected as the
most appropriate and willing to participate in the research effort. The selected program and the
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program director have requested that their identity not be revealed in publication of the research
study.
The awards program that served as the context for this study has held contests for more
than 30 years, with entries received from around the globe, and more than 60 categories of
creativity were assessed each year. In 2014, the awards program received more than 800
separate entries and gave awards in 64 distinct categories, including awards in print categories
such as graphic design, product packaging, magazine and periodical design, newspaper and print
advertising, annual reports, and book covers, as well as for digital and broadcast media design
including website, web and smartphone applications, animation, film, training videos, and
television and radio advertising.
III.4.4 Backgrounds of the Participating Expert Judges
All of the judges who agreed to participate in this research study had broad and diverse
backgrounds in various creative industries, as well as having significant experience working in
and managing creative organizations. All participants were working professionals with 15 or
more years of direct experience in creative professions such as advertising, branding, product
design, photography, copywriting, packaging design, digital media (web and application design),
graphic design, and broadcast media. Several of the participants had experience in multiple
fields, and some had a total of more than 30 years of experience in creative industry. Nine of the
participants were male and three were female. Seven of the participants owned and operated
their own design, branding, or advertising companies or agencies at the time of the study, and the
remainder held positions of senior creative director, senior vice president, or managing director
in their respective organizations.
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Each of the study participants had been awarded numerous individual creativity awards for
own their design work from national and international competitions including Best of Show, Best
in Category, and Gold awards from various contests including the Cannes Lions International
Festival of Creativity, the International Academy of Digital Arts and Sciences (“Webby’s”), the
American Advertising Federation (“ADDY’s”), Communication Arts (“CA”), the American
Graphic Design and Advertising Awards (“AGDA”), Creativity International Awards, and the
Summit Creativity Awards. As past award winners, all of the participants had been invited and
had acted as judges in multiple international, national, and regional awards programs, and many
had served as a judge for more than 20 contests. Many are also recognized public speakers on
creativity and design, and some had published best-selling critically acclaimed books on
advertising, photography, and branding. The participant group for this study also included a past
winner of the U.S. Presidential Design Award, a National Press Photographer of the Year, and a
Pulitzer-prize winning photographer.
III.5 Data Collection
This research follows Yin’s (2009) recommendations for data collection: (1) use of
multiple sources of evidence; (2) development of a case study database; and (3) a documented
chain of evidence (Yin, 2009: 114-124). The research included formal, semi-structured and
probe question-based interviews using Applied Cognitive Task Analysis techniques to question
domain expert judges. Appendix 7.1 provides a summary of the Applied Cognitive Task
Analysis approach used in this study. Advice, feedback, and contextual information were also
obtained from several creativity award programs through informal discussions with program
directors, operators, and participants. Archival documents, including information from various
creativity award program websites, presentations, contest rules and criteria, were also reviewed.
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III.5.1 Observation of Creativity Contest Judging Event, Simulations, Think-Aloud
Exercises and In-Person Interviews of Experts and Contest Administrators
In an effort to further understand the context, background, and activities of judging
creativity in an awards show, the researcher obtained permission to attend and observe an awards
contest-judging event in a major city in the eastern U.S. The judging event is held annually and
takes place over a three-day period in a large hotel ballroom. Judges for each annual contest are
selected by contest administrators based on recommendations from past judges, industry leaders,
prior judging experience for this and other contests, industry experience and recognition as
industry experts. An awards program director and administrative assistant administered the
judging event.
Before the judging process began, the program director for the awards program introduced
the researcher to the eight judges in a group setting, and allowed the researcher to give an
overview of the research and offered judges the opportunity to participate in the study. The
program director and administrative assistant also agreed to be interviewed for the study, and the
researcher was allowed to observe the judging process over the full three-day event. During the
course of the judging event, five judges agreed to be formally interviewed during breaks in the
judging process. All eight judges and the awards program director and administrator also
participated in general roundtable discussions about the awards program and overall judging
process with the researcher after all the judging had concluded. In addition to the interviews and
roundtable discussions, the five judges who consented to be interviewed also agreed to
participate in think-aloud exercises as they scored a sample of actual entries or participated in
simulated judging exercises using entries from the contest that had been previously scored.
The researcher observed all eight judges as they viewed, evaluated, and scored the contest
entries over a three-day period. The formal scoring process began with a short introduction by
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the contest administrator, an overview of the entry categories and explanation of how the entries
were displayed in the ballroom, followed by instructions on how to use the electronic scoring
devices and a review of the schedule of the three-day event. Each judge was assigned an
electronic tablet with a program that allowed him or her to record a numerical score for each
entry by category and to record nominations for the “Best in Show” award, which recognizes the
top entries regardless of category.
Judges were told that many entries were entered in multiple categories; for example, a
photograph in a magazine advertisement might be entered in both the advertising photography
category and the magazine photography category. Each judge was also given a one-page
explanation of the instructions on how to the use the tablet. Included on this sheet was a list of
criteria for the judge to use in scoring entries and an explanation of how awards would be
selected:
Judging Criteria
o 9-10 being excellent! Top of its category (“I wish I had done that!”).
o 7-8 being above average work for the category.
o 5-6 being average work for the category.
o 3-4 being below average work for the category.
o 1-2 should not be considered for an award.
Scores from all judges will be averaged to give the final score. Best in Show
candidate selections will be pulled by staff at the end of the judging and all
nominations will be discussed by the Jury on Saturday.
The judges received no other instructions or directions on how to judge the entries, how to
go about reviewing the categories, or what was expected of them.
Judges were observed over the three days as they moved around the room from table to
table where entries were displayed, and the researcher kept notes of the judges’ actions and
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behaviors. In some instances, the researcher surreptitiously timed (with permission) the
participant judges as they reviewed individual categories and entries, in an attempt to capture
how long participants spent forming assessments. The researcher also took notes as to whether
and when participants worked alone or in concert with other judges, whether judges spoke to
each other about individual entries, and what judges said aloud about the entries and process.
During breaks in the scoring, judges and the contest administrators were observed interacting
and, on several occasions, the researcher engaged in conversation with the group about the
contest, the overall quality of the entries, the research study, and the scoring process. At
different points during lunch and other long breaks, each of the participants was interviewed in a
location away from the other judges. Think-aloud scoring was conducted during judging
sessions, and simulation exercises were held during breaks in the scoring process.
Interviews with the participants during the judging event focused on how each individual
approached the task of judging creative products and ideas, their judging experiences, the criteria
used to assess contest entries, the challenges of judging creativity in a contest setting, the
differences between assessing creativity for an award and in professional practice, the types of
heuristics and techniques participants used to assess creativity, and the potential biases
participants encountered and considered during the assessment of creativity. Participants
explained that the awards program paid for the judges’ accommodations and provided meals
during the event; however, none of the judges were compensated for their participation and each
had to pay for their own travel. During a round-table discussion after the event, many of the
judges said they participated in judging events out of a sense of obligation to the industry, as a
way of staying connected to the very best work in their profession, and to strengthen their
professional credentials.
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After participants had explained as much as they could recall about the assessment process,
the interviewer followed the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis protocol described in Appendix
7.1 to delve into the cognitive aspects of the judging task. Participants were first told to “think
about what you do when you score contest entries” and asked to break down the task of assessing
creative products or ideas into three-to-six steps, and then identify which of the steps required the
most cognitive effort. The interviewer then used the elicited steps to create a “task diagram” that
provided a broad overview of the judging task and was reviewed with the participants for
accuracy and completeness. Generic and specific probe questions were then asked as part of the
“knowledge audit” step to elicit greater detail about each of the identified subtasks and the
cognitive effort necessary to complete them effectively, including critical cues and strategies for
judging creativity broadly and scoring each entry specifically. Concrete examples and specific
information about past experiences and comparisons between how experts and novices might
perform the task were captured during this stage of the interview to create an inventory of taskspecific expertise. Participants identified specific cues and strategies that were explored further
to identify how they were used to make decisions, and to help explain why the task poses
challenges to inexperienced or novice judges. During the simulation interview, five participants
were provided with actual contest entries from a selected category and asked to score each entry
while describing aloud the processes and cognitive steps they undertook. In three cases, the
participant had not judged the entries beforehand, such that their descriptions and scoring were
observed in real-time. In the other two cases, participants had scored the entries previously, and
they repeated their assessments during the interview, describing their thinking and process aloud
as each entry was viewed again.
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The simulation interview was used to build on the information obtained in the first two
steps to contextualize the task, allowing the interviewer to better understand expert judges’
cognitive processes. After the interviews were complete, a “cognitive demands table” of the
information elicited in all the interviews was created to merge and synthesize the data. The
cognitive demands table provided a format for the researcher to identify those areas that required
complex cognitive skills and pertinent problem-solving and decision-making activities involved
in the task of assessing creativity.
III.5.2 Interviews of Judges from Prior Year Contests
After the awards contest judging event, additional participants for this study were solicited
by email from a list of past judges provided by the awards program director. The list contained
names and contact information for 18 judges who had participated in at least one of three
creativity awards contests preceding the 2014 program. The solicitation email described the
research in general terms and requested a response if individuals were interested in participating
in the research. Three past judges responded and agreed to participate within the first week of
the initial email. A second email was sent to the remaining judges on the list the following week,
and two more subsequently agreed to be interviewed. A third and final email was sent two
weeks later, at which point, two more judges agreed to participate. Two judges declined due to
busy schedules. The remaining nine judges on the award program’s list did not respond to any of
the three emails sent.
Interviews of the seven judges who agreed to participate were conducted by telephone
following a semi-structured approach. Each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.
Interview questions were drawn from those posed to judges during in-person interviews at the
contest event. The questioning focused on how the participants generally approached the task of
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judging creative products and ideas, their judging experiences, the criteria used to assess contest
entries, the challenges of judging creativity in a contest setting, the differences between assessing
creativity for an awards program and in professional practice, the types of heuristics participants
used to assess creativity quickly, and the potential biases participants were aware of during the
assessment of creativity. Following the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis protocol, participants
interviewed by phone were also asked to break down the judging task into steps to identify those
that required the most cognitive effort, which helped develop a task diagram. Probe questions
were then asked during the knowledge audit as to subtasks and cognitive effort, critical cues and
strategies employed. Past experiences and comparisons between experts and novices were
explored to create a task-specific inventory with examples. For the simulation portion of the
telephone interviews, participants were presented with a challenging brief scenario drawn from
the in-person judging think-aloud exercises that had been designed in advance specifically for
this purpose. Participants were asked to imagine the scenario, visualizing each step involved,
and describe their thinking and processes. The participants were then probed on issues relating
to situation assessment, potential errors and biases, cues and patterns, and other challenges the
situation might present. The information obtained from these simulation interviews was added to
the cognitive demands table for further analysis and synthesis with data from the in-person
interviews.
III.5.3 Collection of Scoring Data from Observed Event and Prior Contests
After the awards contest judging event concluded, all awards were announced, and all
interviews had been completed, numerical scoring data from the observed contest and nine prior
contests were obtained from the award contest program administrator. The dataset received
assigned a unique anonymous number to each judge and a unique randomly assigned number to
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each entry. Data for ten contests was provided, however, due to apparent errors in the random
assignment of some item numbers, only scores from eight contests were suitable for analysis.
Over the eight contests analyzed, 70 judges scored a total of 8,699 entries. According to the
program director, not every item was scored by every judge in each contest for various reasons
including lack of sufficient time, insufficient familiarity with a particular contest category, and
judges’ unwillingness to rate specific entries with which they were already familiar. Thus, the
number of scores analyzed across the eight contests totaled 63,809.
III.6 Data Analysis
This study follows Miles and Huberman’s (1994) three recommendations for qualitative
case data analysis: (1) data reduction, (2) data display, and (3) conclusion drawing and
verification (Miles & Huberman 1994: 10-12). The data analysis and collection process was
interactive and cyclical, allowing the researcher to reflect, revise, and reconsider, gaining a
deeper understanding of the information collected.
III.6.1 Data Reduction
Data reduction is a process that involves selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and
transforming collected data into more usable forms (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data reduction
occurred continuously throughout this study from before the project began until the final report
was completed. To improve validity and assist in analysis, this research included the use of
various methods for summarizing (contact summary sheets, document summaries, case analysis,
and interim case summaries), different approaches to coding (at both descriptive and inferential
levels), methods to assist in thinking about data (annotations, journaling, and memos), and
methods for producing extended reports throughout the study.
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III.6.2 Data Display
Miles and Huberman (1994) also recommend the use of matrices, graphs, charts, and
diagrams designed to assemble organized information into immediately accessible, compact
forms. Creating a data display was an iterative process, occurring throughout and following data
collection. Additionally, displays were created to compress and order data to allow the
researcher to draw justifiable conclusions. Single-case displays were collected into a matrix,
which were further condensed to permit side-by-side comparisons (Miles & Huberman, 1994:
176). Cross-case displays, composite models, and sequence analysis were particularly helpful in
data analysis by allowing for ordering actions and behaviors and sorting by significant categories
(Miles & Huberman, 1994: 172-187).
III.6.3 Conclusion Drawing and Verification
Data reduction and data display provided the base information for conclusion drawing and
verification. Review of the data collected involved identifying key themes and drawing
conclusions by identifying cues, patterns, processes, justifications, and explanations from the
obtained and observed data. Initial conclusions were kept loose and tentative until further support
was gathered and solidified as the process concluded. The conclusions were then verified after
analysis to improve validity.
III.6.4 Coding
All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the researcher or a professional
transcriptionist. Following the recommendations of Miles and Huberman (1994), data was coded
using both descriptive and inferential codes to facilitate analysis and interpretation. An initial
coding scheme for the interview transcripts of expert judges was developed based on a review of
literature of various definitions and components of creativity, the measurement and assessment
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of creative output, dual process models of judgment and decision making, the various elements
and indicators of expertise and expert cognition, the factors and differentiators of Cognitive
Experiential-Self Theory and Cognitive Continuum Theory, indicators of heuristics and potential
biases, and the aspects of Naturalistic Decision Making, including three different forms of the
Recognition Primed Decision model. From the literature review, 11 major codes and 32 minor
or sub-codes were developed for use in the review and coding of interview transcripts. The
review and coding process inductively generated 3 additional major codes and 14 additional subcodes as several unique concepts, descriptors, and unanticipated aspects of the judging criteria
and process arose from explanations provided by expert judges.
Initial transcript coding involved review and analysis of four transcripts chosen by the
researcher as representative of all interviews conducted. The initial coding scheme and four
selected interview transcripts were imported using NVivo 10 software and “nodes” were created
using the initial coding scheme. The transcripts were then coded using the initial criteria, and
any potential new codes and sub-codes that emerged were coded accordingly on appropriate
transcript portions. Coding was also used to help to identify coherent themes, and initial codes
were modified, expanded, collapsed, and refined as data collection and analysis progressed, as
new themes and patterns emerged.
III.6.5 Check Coding
A check coding process was utilized in an effort to increase both the accuracy and
trustworthiness of the analysis. The four transcripts initially selected for check coding and the
accompanying coding sheet were provided to two independent researchers who had no
connection to the study. The two check coders who were selected to review the transcripts were
trained researchers identified and hired through a freelancer website. Both of the coders have
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doctorate degrees, one in experimental psychology and the other in public health, and both have
published articles in their disciplines. The two check coders separately coded the four transcripts
using the preliminary codes and added new or different codes as they felt appropriate.
Preliminary review indicated overall agreement among coders of between 64% and 85% for the
four transcripts. Discussion between the coders revealed that most of the differences related to
assign multiple codes to the same data and choices between closely related codes. As a result,
some codes were collapsed into broader concepts while other codes were divided into more
discrete elements. After several discussions, all coders reached general agreement on the main
and subsidiary codes and coding of the data. All remaining transcripts were coded by the
researcher using the agreed coding scheme and coding approach.
III.6.6 Ethical considerations
All participants consented to be interviewed for the study and to have their interviews
audiotaped. A consent form, approved by the university Institutional Review Board, was
provided to each participant before the interviews. To preserve the confidentiality of the
participants, the awards program and the data provided, all interview tapes, notes from
observations and interviews, and collateral data collected were kept in a locked cabinet or in a
password protected file on the researcher’s personal computer. When the interviews were
transcribed, code names were used to identify the participants in place of their real names and,
where reported, code names are used. All judging scores received from the awards program were
anonymous, with numbers assigned to individual judges and all entries identified by item
numbers only.

67

III.7 Issues of Trustworthiness
For qualitative research, issues of trustworthiness surround the credibility, dependability,
confirmability, and transferability of the study results. Credibility relates to whether the research
findings are accurate and credible reflections of information provided by the participants or
otherwise obtained (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Credibility also relates to whether the
methodology chosen is logically related to the objectives of the study. In this study, efforts were
taken to improve the credibility of the research design, including obtaining data from multiple
sources, soliciting feedback from industry members to narrow and refine the field of inquiry,
actively searching for contrary findings and contradictory data, applying different research
methods to obtain data, and reviewing the findings with colleagues to confirm the data collected.
Dependability for qualitative research involves an assurance that the findings are consistent
with the data. Such dependability requires objective reviews of the data and development of
procedures to reduce researcher bias and identifying data inconsistencies (Lincoln & Guba,
2000). In this study, several efforts were made to increase dependability of the findings,
including the use of check coding by individuals with doctorate-level research experience who
were not connected to the current study, improvement of the coding and refinement of the coding
scheme based on input from independent coders, maintaining a journal of the research and
decision-making processes, as well as using the data display and conclusion drawing and
verification techniques recommended by Miles & Huberman (1994). Transferability of the study
results is concerned with how the findings of his study may be used in other contexts.
Transferability is improved when the data are shared in a rich, detailed manner that allows the
reader to fully understand the context and information to determine how study findings might be
usefully applied in other settings. To improve transferability of this study, verbatim quotes of
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participants’ responses along with detailed explanations of the context of the judging process,
observations and awards program are provided.
III.8 Anticipated Limitations and Delimitations
As with any research, this study was anticipated to involve several limitations inherent in
the nature of the research approach and the methods employed. First, since the study is
necessarily limited to a small number (12) of recognized creative domain experts operating at a
very high level of performance, it is difficult to generalize to a larger population of experts from
other domains or to individuals without this recognized level of expertise. However, the 12
participants represented a broad spectrum of creative disciplines and each had significant
experience in judging creativity both professionally and in awards contests, as well as decades of
professional experience as a creative employee and manager. The number of participants was
deemed sufficient in light of the limited number of experts in the field, the depth of information
each provided about their processes and understanding of the issues, their level of expertise in
the field, and the fact that multiple participants provided similar information. This similarity in
participant responses indicated agreement on the main issues and relative complete coverage of
the data obtained. Second, as this qualitative study involved events and actions viewed
retrospectively, and using information relayed to the researcher during individual interviews of
participants, it may be subject to biases or gaps in memory and perception of the participants,
lack of conscious understanding of the nature of the processes employed, and filtering or efforts
to appear socially acceptable or helpful to the research effort. Numerous techniques previously
discussed were employed to reduce filtering and biases in memory, including semi-directed
interviews, real-time think-aloud protocols and simulations. Third, this study is limited by the
single researcher’s ability to analyze and interpret the observed and collected data, as well as the
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researcher’s own cognitive biases and perceptions from the researcher’s professional experience
in the domain of study. Several techniques described in this section were used to maintain
objectivity, including reviewing the data and conclusions with third parties in both academia and
creative industries, and the use of independent data coders.
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IV FINDINGS
IV.1 Introduction
The purpose of this field study was to investigate the processes and criteria domain experts
use in assessing the output creativity by individuals who regularly create products in real-world
settings. To facilitate this investigation, expert judges from an established international
creativity awards program were observed in a field setting and participated in semi-structured
interviews. Understanding how domain experts make judgments about professionals’ creatively
in their products and ideas, in situations where judges face significant time pressure, uncertainty,
and high stakes, provides useful insights into how creativity is assessed in real-world situations.
These insights may also increase understanding of the challenges that creativity researchers face
in assessing creative output in experimental studies, suggest refinements to assessment methods
and practices to improve the overall reliability and validity of creativity research, and improve
the discernment of creativity in organizational settings.
This chapter provides the main from the interviews field observations, real-time exercises,
collateral data, and the results from inter-rater reliability testing of judges’ scores both from the
observed contest and prior creativity award contests. Five major findings were gleaned from a
detailed analysis of the research data:
1. All (100%) of the participants reported they did not specifically use the “novel and
useful” definition of creativity that is prevalent in research, with most stating the definition was
inadequate and incomplete for judging creativity. Instead, participants reported they look for a
combination of as many as six distinct elements as key indicators of creative output: 1)
uniqueness, novelty or surprise; 2) inventiveness or advancement of the state of the art; 3) overall
quality of execution; 4) conceptual impact or cleverness of idea; 5) level of artisanship necessary
to achieve the conceptual goal(s); and 6) utility, usefulness or appropriateness to the task.
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2. A large majority (10 of 12 [83%]) of participants reported they use the same or very
similar processes, criteria and standards to assess creative products and ideas in their workplaces
as they do in creativity award contests.
3. The majority (9 of 12 [75%]) of participants reported that highly creative products and
ideas produce an “immediate” positive or “gut” reaction, often accompanied by a strong
emotional and/or physical response (sometimes termed “goose bumps”) and stated the most
highly creative work is readily identifiable, even among very high-level professional creative
work, indicating intuition is a significant element of the participant’s assessment of creativity.
However, more than half of participants (7 of 12) reported also using some form of rational
analysis to assess the level of creativity after their initial response, and to modify or confirm their
initial intuitive assessments.
4. All of the participants (100%) stated they believed novices would find it very difficult
to assess professional creative products and ideas, identified several types of mistakes the
participants themselves had made as novices, and indicated they believed non-experts would be
inclined to make similar types of errors (termed by some as “the novice trap”) in attempting to
assess professional creativity.
5. Most participants (7 of 12 [58%]) acknowledged using various heuristics or rules of
thumb to judge entries, and stated they were aware of several types of biases that might affect
their judgment; however, participants also believed they were able to reduce the effect of these
biases through their substantial judging experience, deliberate mindfulness of the potential for
biases, and the use of the Consensual Assessment Technique.
The following sections discuss each of the findings in more detail and draw support from
the pilot study data and interviews of creative managers, Applied Cognitive Task Analysis
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interviews of the 12 participants, direct observations by the researcher during a three-day judging
event, and in-person judging simulations and think-aloud exercises with five of the participants.
In total, 18 hours of recorded interviews resulted in more than 340 pages of typed transcripts that
were coded and analyzed. Illustrative quotations from the interview transcripts are provided
below to allow the reader a deeper view into the experiences and perspectives of the study
participants in their own words; however, pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of the
participants. In addition, the researcher’s observations of the judging event and the responses of
participants in the simulations and think-aloud protocols were recorded in contemporaneous
notes, subsequently coded and analyzed, and are interwoven into the findings to provide a
broader perspective of the cognitive and behavioral aspects of the activities observed.
Information gleaned from program administrators was also included to provide further context of
the field setting, the participants, and their behaviors. Finally, a statistical summary and the
results of inter-rater reliability testing of judges’ scores assessed on 63,800 items in eight
awards’ program contests over five years are provided.
IV.2 Findings from interviews, observations and exercises
“The guy who invented the first wheel, he was an idiot. The guy who invented the other
three, he was a genius.” - Sid Caesar (1922-2014)
Finding 1: All (100%) of the participants reported they did not specifically use the
“novel and useful” definition of creativity that is prevalent in research, with most stating the
definition was inadequate and incomplete for judging creativity. Instead, participants reported
they look for a combination of as many as six distinct elements as key indicators of creative
output: 1) uniqueness, novelty or surprise; 2) inventiveness or advancement of the state of the
art; 3) overall quality of execution; 4) conceptual impact or cleverness of idea; 5) level of
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artisanship necessary to achieve the conceptual goal(s); and 6) utility, usefulness or
appropriateness to the task.
The primary finding of this research study is that participants did not believe the “novel
and useful” definition of creativity relied upon by researchers was adequate, reflective, or
practicable in assessing creativity in professional award contests or in workplace settings. All of
the participants felt strongly that defining creativity as being simply “novel and useful” or
“unique and appropriate” failed to capture the essence, scale or totality of the concept of
creativity as used in practice.
The definition [novel and useful] is definitely narrow—it feels like textbook. It’s not
reality. I mean, if I was looking at a bunch of collateral brochures, let’s say, what would
be novel with all of those? Well, it would be one that somehow is different from the rest,
right? Then you start looking for differences: “Oh, I guess this one’s novel because it
opens landscape versus traditional.” You’d have to look for some reason to call it novel.
And ‘useful’, well they all serve the same purpose, so I don’t know if you could say that
one is more useful than the other in that context. (Christine)
During interviews, most of the participants denied using any particular definition or criteria for
judging creativity in contest situations. Moreover, during think-aloud exercises as the judges
scored actual entries in the contest, several participants became frustrated trying to explain their
process or identify the criteria being used. One participant described the difficulty in explaining
his criteria or steps during one think-aloud exercise as “dumbing it down”:
Jeremy: “Ok, that one is really good.”
Researcher: “Why?”
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Jeremy: “It just…everything works. I’m describing this to you like I’m in school again,
and I’m explaining it to my professor or a teacher why I think this design is worthy. But I’m
really dumbing it down…no offense…because it’s the only way I know how to say it. There
aren’t any words I can use to express what I’m feeling and thinking right now, the combination
of all these things and why it matters.”
During simulated judging exercises using entries that had already been scored, several
other participants also stated they could not describe the process of judging creativity or
separately identify all of the criteria they used in the judging process. One participant expressed
the difficulty as having “no language” to describe what she was thinking:
Well, there is no language to attribute what you do when judging…and there is no way to
separate the various component parts that make up an ultimate impression or decision in
your mind. No one breaks it apart like that. You might be able to say where it fails, or that
it just doesn’t rise to the level, but you can’t explain [why something is creative] in words.
(Angela)
Other participants pointed to the significant time pressure involved in judging a large number of
items, and the importance of the contest to the entrants as both contributing to an environment of
high stress and insufficient time to do more than briefly review and quickly score each entry.
While all participants felt the “novel and useful” definition of creativity used in research is
inadequate and incomplete for their purposes in assessing creativity in practice, through the use
of Applied Cognitive Task Analysis techniques (structured probe questions, knowledge audits,
and creation of lists of cognitive demands, see Appendix 7.1) a number of descriptions were
elicited from participants with regard to the most important characteristics judges look for when
assessing particularly creative items in a contest setting.

75

In an effort to better understand the criteria that experts look for in creative entries,
participants were asked as part of the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis interviews to describe
examples of entries that had been scored very high or that had failed to score high for one or
more particular reason. While the participants’ descriptions of the specific elements they
recalled about memorable entries where not all encompassing or complete, and did not
necessarily generalize across different contest categories, the descriptions began to uncover some
of the criteria, cues, and patterns experts appeared to use when assessing creativity. As
participants became more aware of the elements they could recall, they began to develop
explanations for how they made their decisions.
In general terms, several participants suggested the criteria for an award winning entry is
simply whether the entry is more creative than anything else the judge has seen in that category,
with the top-rated entries simply perceived as “better than” what that judge might have been able
to create facing the same tasks, using their own skill and experience as the standard:
Everybody is looking for fresh. Everybody wants to be “wowed.” If you want the single
biggest criteria for a contest it’s: “Astonish me.” That’s what you want; you want to say
to yourself, “God, I wish I had done that! That was great!” That doesn’t happen often, but
it happens. (Bill)
“I know something is really creative when I think to myself, ‘I don’t even know if I could
have ever come up with that.’” (Leonard)
The standard of “I wish I had done that” was also the description at the top of the “judging
criteria” form given to participants at the judging event. According to the director of the awards
program, that quotation was incorporated into the form after she heard several judges use it in
prior contests to describe the most creative entries.
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When asked to recall examples of the most creative entries they had seen, most participants
described two aspects of creative work that combine broad concepts of “idea” and “execution,”
and stated that both should be present to a significant degree in order for an item to be considered
highly creative:
Good creativity is part great design and part quality execution. A great idea with bad
execution would get a 5 [out of ten], same with great execution but not a great idea. Great
idea and great execution is going to get a 9 or a 10. (Angela)
Other participants referred to a description of creativity that was similar to the “novel and useful”
definition used in creativity research, but with the additional elements of functionality, ingenuity,
overall concept, engagement and cleverness:
You’re walking that fine line with the architecture you create that needs to be very
inspired, but then it needs to be very functional. And if you look at it the functionality is
key, because if it’s not functional people won’t fall in love with it. And then on top of that,
I feel it’s the creativity because if you do something that is creative, but not functional,
then it is art, and I’m not judging art. It’s how uniquely someone solves a problem. Or
how do you sell a very common method in an uncommon and sticky manner that just left
all of us speechless or it sneaked up from behind, so we are just like, “wow, this is really
different!” (Fritz)
To me a great creative work is never just one aspect, it’s the whole package…the criteria I
use is ‘concept’…it’s clever, it’s smart, it’s using wit or humor or intelligence or creativity
in both the look, but also in the words. And then, depending on what it is, I start looking at
the typography, the colors used, the photography, the illustration, how the words are placed
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on the page, and then the balance and proportion and all of those more graphic design rules
start to come into play. (Christine)
To me, it’s the concept. I try to look at it as the consumer or user of the product, would it
engage me. That’s difficult sometimes because I may not be the target audience; so I have
to put myself in their position, try to make it up. Is it engaging from an execution
standpoint, is the layout clean, does it follow good rules of design, or does it diverge in a
way that is interesting and appealing, does it make me want to pick it up and learn more?
(Leonard)
I think if it’s too confusing or hard to “get” then it probably isn’t very creative. It can’t be
so different and bizarre that it doesn’t make sense. Especially in packaging or marketing,
it has to get to the point quickly and in a clever way; it has to cause a response, otherwise it
may be beautiful, but it’s worthless. (Edward)
Other participants appeared to identify three components of newness, beauty, and “interesting”
functionality as the key factors.
I am looking for three things: Is it unique? Is it solving the problem in an interesting way?
Is it visually appealing? (Richard)
One participant shared an example of an entry that had won top honors in a prior contest with
these three components:
An example of something I found truly creative the first time I saw it was Perlex, which is
for a web page, and as you scroll down certain images appear to float up and they move
and you get multiple layers happening. That’s probably been five or six years out on the
market now, but when I first saw that in a competition it was, “wow—amazing! This is
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totally new!” And it won because we hadn’t seen it before, it was beautiful, and it did
something really interesting. (Fritz)
Several other participants indicated they were more focused on the “quality” of key elements in a
creative product or idea:
In our studio, we have three things we are looking for: quality of the idea, quality of the
design, and then quality of the execution. So all of those things are critical for us and
everything that we judge before it goes to the client has to meet those standards. And one
of the things that creates a “wow” moment is when the quality of the idea knocks you out.
And then, of course, common to all is quality of the execution. If you have great ideas and
brilliant design that’s badly executed, they’re out the door. (Bill)
I’m looking for great concept, great execution, and great subject matter. I’m looking for
consistency, messaging, layout and design, photography or illustration, does it all work,
that’s all part of it. If it’s done technically correct, maybe it’s perfect, but if falls flat on the
messaging or it’s boring, it doesn’t communicate, then it shouldn’t win an award. (David).
Some participants concentrated more on the challenge presented to the designer, and how they
applied ingenuity, concept, elegance, and inspiration, to the overall execution:
For me, the main question is: how much of a creative challenge was it? The harder the
challenge, and the more the entry achieved that challenge in an inspiring, elegant and
thoughtful way, the more points I’m going to give it. And then it’s whether I’ve seen
anything like it before, does it open a realm of possibilities or thinking that I’ve never had
before. Last is the execution, when I am blown away with what they were able to achieve
technically. (Jeremy)
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It has to be different, thought provoking. Everything’s been done before, but something
that’s done in a different manner, where maybe the execution with the end product is
something that is going to make me say, “Wow, I wish I had done that!” Or, “wow, how
did they do that?” That’s going to get my highest score. (Martin)
With regard to whether items in a contest are judged against a minimum standard, most
participants indicated entries were assessed in comparison to current work in creative industries
and needed to show a significant advancement in the “state of the art,” in addition to being
measured against all other items in the category or contest:
Definitely there is a minimum [level of creativity] required, in a sense; to get an award, it
has to be creative compared to the rest of the industry, it can’t just be slightly more creative
than the other items to win. You have to compare the entries to what you’ve seen outside
of the contest to see if it’s really different from other stuff out there. If none of the entries
are really creative, I won’t score any of them highly. (Christine)
I may see several different entries that are interesting or unique for different reasons. I
usually know right away if something is really creative, so I will remember that. But
when I score the items, I don’t give one item an 8 and then compare the others from there.
Each entry gets a score based on the overall execution compared to what I know from the
industry. (Martin)
We all get copies of the books that are published with all of the winners from the various
awards programs out there, and we are constantly looking at what others are doing in the
industry, so we have a pretty good idea of what the industry is doing. (Bill)
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Most of the participants agreed that while their judgments are, to a degree, based on their
subjective opinions of what is visually appealing, they attempt to score the “execution” or
technical achievement of contest entries using a more objective perspective of the level of
artisanship execution, delivery of concept, and effort involved in the work:
I think I make more of an objective decision first, because I know what it takes to do
something, to put together a magazine cover or advertisement. You have to be able to pick
out a photo, pick the right colors and the font, and those are all disciplines where if at the
end its not done well and not compelling, I won’t score it very high. If it’s done well and
is creative…it may not be my cup of tea…I don’t particularly like supra ultra modern but,
if there’s a compelling magazine cover that leverages those types of tools and aesthetic and
it’s done really well, then I would score it high. (Amy)A really good technical entry will
kind of become the measuring stick and so all the other entries will have to beat that to
win, but that’s why it’s a contest. And if there are other entries that are as good or better,
then we have to figure out which is the top. But if all the other entries are technically
really weak then it doesn’t matter. (Edward)
As discussed in Finding 4 below, during the Knowledge Audit stage of Applied Cognitive Task
Analysis, some participants were able to more clearly describe and explain the criteria they use
to identify creativity in professional work.
Finding 2: A large majority (10 of 12 [83%]) of participants reported they use the same or
very similar processes, criteria, and standards to assess creative products and ideas in their
workplaces as they do in creativity award contests.
My approach tends to be [what] I call ‘fly-by.’ Let’s say there’s 20 items in whatever
category we’re viewing. I’ll do a fly-by and just see if anything stands out to me. And so
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then maybe I narrow it down to five—the most attractive, or the most creative, and then I’ll
come back and then take a closer look at each of those five. And then whittle it down from
there. So, it’s an elimination process, I guess. But that’s pretty much how I do it in our
agency too, just on a smaller scale. (Christine)
For me, personally, judging is no different. It’s like when I meet my team as creative
director, and I see seven different ideas, and it’s going to take me three minutes to just go
through them and say, “no, no, no, yes, and here’s why, and let’s move forward with this
and why don’t you take it for a spin on that idea?” (Fritz)
Some of the differences between judging awards contests and assessing creativity in the
workplace the participants revealed centered around the amount of time available to review each
item, the availability of background information on the client or problem presented, and the
ability to discuss the output during the creative process in the workplace which is not possible in
a contest setting:
The process is different because there is probably more communication back and forth in
an agency setting. If somebody in the office says: “which of these do you like?” I’m
probably going to be inquisitive about it, where in an awards show you don’t have that
ability. The other thing with the show is, you’re maybe in the first section, you’re judging,
and you’re looking down the room and you’ve got 50 more sections you have to get
through by 3 p.m. or something, and so you’re like: Ok, I have to set time limits for myself
that I have to keep moving. (Christine)
Interviewer: How is judging entries in creativity competitions different than how you
decide whether something is creative in your agency?
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Leonard: I wouldn’t say it’s different at all. I’m just critical. The only difference is
maybe I take more time, obviously, internally with my team to make sure that they are
following the same rules and make changes.
Sometimes the entry will have a short paragraph on the back or another page written by the
designer or team that explains a little of the background, what they were trying to
accomplish, maybe why they chose a certain approach. I like to read those because I get a
better understanding of the challenge that was presented and how the contestant looked at
it. That kind of information makes it more like my role at my agency where I’m usually
critiquing the work of others with a limited amount of background on the client and project
brief. (Edward)
The researcher also observed the process of some participants during the three-day judging
event. The 2014 judging event was conducted in a hotel ballroom in a major metropolitan city
on the East Coast of the United States. Eight judges had been selected for the event by the
program director, and each traveled to the venue at their own expense. The awards program paid
for the judges’ accommodations and provided meals during the event; however, none of the
judges were compensated for their participation. During a round-table discussion after the event,
many of the judges said they participated in judging events out of a sense of obligation to the
industry, as a way of staying connected to the very best work in their profession, and to
strengthen their professional credentials.
At the beginning of the judging event, the judges gathered to receive instructions and scoring
devices in large ballroom where entries were laid out on long tables separated by category. Each
judge was given an electronic tablet and a one-page explanation of how to use it in the judging
process. After the program director generally described the judging criteria on the forms, each
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judge was shown how to input their scores on the tablet device, and the group was told they had
three days to score all of the entries (in excess of 800 entries in more than 60 categories), and to
separately mark on the tablet any entries they wished to nominate for Best in Show. The judges
received no other instructions or directions on how to judge the entries, how to go about
reviewing the categories, or what was expected of them.
Once released to start reviewing items, judges moved slowly around the ballroom,
appearing to drift aimlessly among the entries and tables. About 15 minutes after moving among
the tables, one judge sat down at a table and began perusing a group of entries held in a binder,
but she did not appear to be scoring any of the items. A few minutes later, another judge sat
down at a different table and he too began thumbing through the items but did not appear to be
entering any scores on his tablet. Other judges appeared to look at only a few items at a table
before moving on to another. After about 25 minutes, the first of the eight judges appeared to
start entering scores on his tablet device. Within 45 minutes, all the judges were reviewing items
and entering scores. However, during the first hour of the judging event, not one of the judges
was seen or heard speaking to any other judge. One of the participants later explained why he
took this approach:
In general, I’m trying to [judge] alone…I’ve found for some [of the categories] you start
seeing herds of people. But I try to avoid that because you do get swayed, as much as you
try not. You’ll hear people saying: “Oh, this is amazing, did you see this!?” and I don’t
want to hear it; it does play into your psyche…And that is the risk of doing it as a group.
(Leonard)
Once the scoring process began in earnest, a pattern seemed to emerge among the judges.
Judges moved around until they came to a category that was physically away from the other
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judges and then either stand or sit at the table where the entries were placed. Several judges
were observed looking almost casually at some of the items in the category, handling and
viewing each for only a few seconds before moving to the next. After several or all of the items
were viewed in this way (usually depending on the number of entries in the category), the judges
would review the items again and started to enter scores on the tablet. When all the scores were
entered, the judges moved away from the table, and the process would repeat wherein judges
moved around each other politely but maintained their distance. One of the participants
explained why he preferred this approach:
I am a packaging and graphic designer, I prefer to see the physical version of the entries
over seeing them online or just a photo. That’s why I like this awards program, all of the
entries are physically here and I can touch them and compare them. And I can review
entries at my pace without being influenced in any way by other judges. (Richard)
The first time any of the judges talked to each after the event began was outside the
ballroom during a spontaneous break. However, during the first day, the judges appeared to
make only small talk during breaks and over lunch; there was no discussion of the contest
entries. In fact, the first time the researcher overheard any judge discussing an entry was in the
afternoon on the second day of judging. In this instance, one of the judges had just walked away
from a category after scoring and was approached by another judge who asked, “Are you all
done with that category?” When the other judge replied yes, the two judges discussed one entry
in that category both had already scored and agreed they thought it should be considered for Best
in Show. As the judging process continued that second day, more judges were overheard
discussing specific entries or categories, usually in the context of a particular entry that might be
considered for a top award. This judging and scoring process, primarily conducted in isolation,
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with breaks to discuss entries that they had already scored, continued over the contest’s three
days.
During breaks in judging, the researcher was able to discuss the contest with all of the
judges, and five of the judges consented to participate in the study and be interviewed. Four of
the participants also agreed to take part in think-aloud exercises while judging contest entries in
one of the categories or during simulated judging exercises using entries they had already scored.
After the exercises concluded, these four participants were interviewed and provided more
specifics about the process used in judging contest entries. Several participants confirmed that it
is important that they judge separately to reduce the possibility of being influenced, and that they
try to assess the level of creativity in the contest before scoring any items:
So I look over all of the entries in a particular category first, as I said, then I go back and do
the scoring. I want to get an idea of the overall quality and creativity, and if I see
something really great, I will remember it, and then score it more highly when I come back
to do the actual numbers. (James)
The contest gives us a rating sheet and, basically, a 1 or 2 has no creativity at all, a 9-10 is
at the very top, it is the best of the category and maybe one of the best in the whole show.
If something is good, but not quite as good as it could be, maybe the coloring wasn’t quite
right or the concept was a little off or just another version of something else we’ve seen
before, then it will still get a 5 or 6, but I can’t give it a top score. (Martin)
During applied cognitive task analysis dialogues with participants about the cognitive effort
required to judge creativity, many identified the most challenging part to be separating and
ranking the very best entries from others that are very good. Most participants stated they felt
different entries may be highly creative for different reasons and comparing them was almost
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impossible, especially if for different categories or if they have different levels of complexity.
Below a score of 7, all of the participants said the decision was rather straightforward, and that
they tend to gravitate toward giving scores of around 3 to 5 at the low end to make a clear
separation between those worthy of consideration and those below the “highly creative”
threshold.
In fact, not all of the judges used the entire 1 to 10 scale suggested by the contest
administrators (see summary statistical analysis of judges’ scores in Table 1 of Section 4.3
below). One of the participants in this study stated he rarely gave an entry a score of 10, as he
felt the top score should be reserved for only the very best of the best, sharing that he uses the
following quote as his guide for score of 10: “’Perfection is achieved, not when there is nothing
more to add, but when there is nothing left to take away.’ [Antoine de Saint-Exupery (1900 1944)] The longer you’ve been in the business, the fewer things get a 10 because you’ve seen a
lot.” (Edward). Another participant, Amy, said she rarely gives scores below a 5 because she
knows all entries were created by professionals so they must be at least “average.”
While observing the event, the researcher noticed variation in the amount of time judges
spent on viewing and scoring each item. To test this variation, on the second day when the
judges appeared to have become proficient at using the tablet for scoring, the researcher
attempted to surreptitiously record the amount of time four different judges each spent looking at
individual entries in various categories and noted how long it took those judges to enter their
scores. Depending on the category, and allowing for the inexact nature of timing individuals
from a distance, all four judges appeared to spend less than two seconds reviewing each item that
consisted of a single page in a binder or of a single item on a table. A similar amount of time
(two seconds) was generally spent recording scores, but in a few instances, judges were observed
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viewing up to six entries in a row and then entering scores for all six items at the same time.
Sometimes, judges spent considerably more time on single item, usually between five and eight
seconds, and in some cases more than 10 seconds, looking at the entry more thoroughly and
critically. Interestingly, none of the judges were timed spending between two and five seconds
to evaluate any of the entries. When asked individually after the scoring was complete about the
instances when they took more time, judges indicated those particular items appeared more
creative and potentially worthy of a higher score, and the judges wanted to spend more time
considering the entry to be sure, in particular looking at execution and detail. One of the
participants explained his thinking:
Usually, you can tell really quickly if something is good or great, it stands out. So then I’m
just trying to decide whether it gets an 8 or 9 or whatever. The other entries that aren’t
very good, there’s no need to spend any time on those. But some categories have more
going into them, like big corporate reports or a video, you have to go through those and see
all of it, so those categories do take longer. (Richard)
Only one participant (Jeremy) said he would sometimes go back to other items after he
began judging and modify his previous scores based on the quality of subsequent entries viewed.
Most of the other participants said they didn’t have time to go back and revise their scores, and
all participants said they felt very confident that the scores they awarded were correct based on
their experience and knowledge of the industry and in comparison with other items in the
contest.
I’m not going to lie, first impressions matter. If something doesn’t get my attention right
away with the quality of work and ideas presented, I’m probably not going to spend the
time to dig through it to find something creative about it. (Edward)
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A few participants, however, indicated the standard they used might change depending on the
level of creativity being shown at the contest.
I feel that at the beginning of a show obviously the first pieces are much more about my
professional viewpoint. And then as I go let’s say half a day through an award show… I’m
already going to be jaded by my background of that half day. So if I see really bad work
that half day, suddenly something I thought was a five might suddenly turn into a seven
just because I’ve seen so much bad stuff [laughter] but in the end it’s all relative to the
other entries. (Fritz)
If it’s really fantastic, even with crappy presentation, I’ll give it an award, if it’s that
amazing and cutting edge. So I’m not saying that I’m never going to give anything an
award if it’s sloppily done, but me, personally, I have a hard time looking past that,
because it’s a given. If you’re going to take the time to enter something in a contest, then
surely you can do a credible, decent job with it. (David).
Finding 3: The majority (9 of 12 [75%]) of participants reported that highly creative
products and ideas produce an “immediate” positive or “gut” reaction, often accompanied by a
strong emotional and/or physical response (sometimes termed “goose bumps”), and stated that
the most highly creative work is easily identifiable, even among professional creative work,
indicating intuition is a significant element of an expert’s assessment of creativity. However,
more than half of participants (7 of 12) reported also using some form of rational analysis to
assess the level of creativity and to modify or confirm their initial intuitive assessments.
David: “If it hits me in the gut, it’s a winner.”
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It’s mainly really a gut instinct. But gut instinct based on my experience, based on my
knowledge, based on looking at creative work every day and being in between my own
creative team and their creative instinct and egos. (Fritz)
During a think-aloud exercise while judging an actual contest category, one participant had a
very sudden emotional and visible physical reaction as he turned the pages of a binder of entries
and came upon one particularly creative entry and stopped:
So, I just look at each item, kind of going through them like this and saying pretty quickly,
“no…not great…that’s just ok…maybe a 5.” Uh…[2-3 seconds pass, the participant does
not move while staring at the entry, he is visibly moved]…oh my. I, uh…wow! I mean,
there…[he slaps the page of the binder]…look! [He points at his forearm] See, I have
goose bumps!!” (Martin)
Most of the participants reported highly creative work often produces a strong visceral response.
Amy said, “If something is really creative, I want to eat it. I want to lay in it, I want to put that
all over my body and feel happy all the time.” Angela concurred, saying “If it’s given me delight
in some way then I’m going to give it a higher rating.”
Most of the participants also said their response to an item’s creativity, or lack there of,
was almost instantaneous, and that it was the magnitude of impact on the viewer that signaled the
level of creativity:
I have to see the effort involved…there has to be a spark of something non-traditional and
an effort to express something, you know, compelling. I can tell immediately…whether
it’s good or bad, you know, that there was an approach that pushed it out of the ordinary, I
think that is what creative means to me. (Amy)
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There are always those cases where there’s something that is just like “whoa, that’s
amazing!” And for some reason it resonates with you. If it’s purely a creativity criteria, I
think usually at this point it’s something that happens pretty quickly, that one’s going to
stand out immediately. Let’s assume it’s something simple, it’s one page, I’m looking at
each for probably no more than three seconds initially…which is, in the real world, it’s two
point five seconds [laughs]. I know they’ve put a lot of effort into putting together their
submissions in, so I don’t want to make a rash judgment, I want to give each entry it’s due
time, but usually I know it when I see it. (Christine)
Does it work for the target audience? Does it fit the purpose of the creative brief and even
though you don’t get a creative feel for every single piece you look at, you have an idea if
it is right for the client and consumer. So you assume a lot of things but this and that,
target audience, purpose, my experience and my knowledge are mixed up and then you
give a very quick instant vote. (Fritz)
However, some participants (David, Leonard, and Martin) said the speed of their process and
judgments might have had more to do with the limited amount of time available to judge a very
large number of entries in a contest than with the ease of identifying creative work, and that they
had to accept their initial impressions as valid because they were unable to spend as much time
as they might like on each entry. Others (Fritz, David, and Edward) mentioned they race through
entries looking for only the very best and grade those that make an immediate impression as
more creative because, “I don’t want to be looking at bad work all day” (David).
While almost all of the participants agreed they often had an immediate response to highly
creative work, most added they felt the immediate response needed to be tempered with a more
analytical review before giving a final score:
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If it’s really complex, it might slow things down, but for the most part, you’re making an
instantaneous judgment that’s the combination of all of that experience, discipline,
knowledge that you have, that creates that instant physical response, and the only word that
comes out of your mouth is “wow.” And then you start to take it apart. (Bill)
Sometimes when you’re looking at a piece of work on a table, I notice the executional
qualities first. Call it a five second look—those kind of things. Then I start to look more
closely. The concept comes first and then you get to make your way to execution and then
you hope the execution actually makes the idea better than worse. Nothing depresses me
more than a great idea ruined by poor execution. (James)
There’s a kind of visceral side of judging and then there’s a cognitive side. From a visceral
side, you see something and the question is does it make you say, “Wow!” Or does it give
you an emotional reaction, does it raise the hairs on the back of your neck? But then you
have the logical reaction to it, does it work like it’s supposed to or what am I getting for
my money? (Jeremy)
Many participants spent the additional time and analysis to consider the artisanship and
execution of the concept and creative idea, and they ultimately compared the creativity with
other entries:
If it wows me or if there’s a really brilliant idea there or something you know has a really
unique way of showing me something that’s in it. Or it surprises me, or delights me, or
intrigues me, or it pulls me in. That’s what just stops you and makes you take notice. But
then as a judge it’s your job to really take a look at the craft. You have to dissect it. I start
with the idea behind the work, then I look at, “Okay, how well did they execute that idea?”
(Angela)
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You can tell pretty quickly…I break it down into the nanoseconds. I think it is the visual
quality first that I recognize, the visual design, the taste and finesse of the execution. The
first thing that stops me is, “has it been done well?” And that’s the reverse process for
work at the office. It’s concept first and then execution at my agency, but here where
everything has been fully executed, you notice execution first and then look to see what the
idea was, but it still happens very quickly. (James)
Interviewer: How quickly do you recognize when an entry is very creative?
Leonard: Like one second. But then I have to say, “Are my eyes deceiving me?” And then
I have to look at it more closely, and I have to see everything else in that category to be
sure. There may be something else that’s even better.
Finding 4: All of the participants (100%) stated that they felt novices would find it very
difficult to assess professional creative products and ideas, identifying several mistakes the
participants themselves had made as novices, and that they believed non-experts would be
inclined to make similar types of errors (termed by some “the novice trap”) in attempting to
assess professional creativity.
Although not a particularly surprising finding considering their level of experience and
backgrounds, all of the participants felt strongly that judging creativity for both awards and for
professional work requires not only extensive experience in a creative industry assessing
products and ideas, but also significant skill and direct experience in doing actual creative work.
For example, Amy said, “You have to some years of experience to be able to appreciate the
craftsmanship enough to be objective.”
To judge creativity someone needs to be a trained designer and have creative work
experience, otherwise it’s just subjective opinion with no basis in the industry. They might
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just be looking for what’s pretty or something they haven’t seen before but everyone in the
trade already has. They’re not looking for technical design elements, just what they like.
(Leonard)
There are lots of other contests out there where the judges are celebrities or executives in
an industry with little or no real experience, and they seem to give awards to the things that
personally excite them. But unless they really know what’s going on in the industry and
the level of effort required to pull off a truly creative idea, they just fall for the first thing
that grabs their attention or looks cool in the moment. We see it in our agency all the time:
clients and junior designers will get all excited about the next “new thing,” and they can’t
help but think it’s the best. But that’s the novice’s trap, they can’t get out of that way of
thinking until they have actually been working in the field a while and considered all the
other great work that’s out there. (Bill)
As part of the second stage of the cognitive task analysis process, the Knowledge Audit (App.
7.1), some participants were asked why certain parts of the task might pose a challenge to
novices and were encouraged to imagine the kinds of mistakes a novice or non-expert might
make when judging the creative work of others. All of the participants who responded to these
task analysis probes where able to draw on past experiences and conceive of multiple ways
someone without the requisite level of experience might incorrectly judge a product or idea as
creative, or fail to identify a highly creative entry. Interestingly, during this phase of the CTA
process, participants found their voice in explaining the key criteria they look for when assessing
creativity. Most of the participants’ examples of novice mistakes directly related to a lack of
knowledge and inability to recognize several key elements of creativity: what has come before
(lack of novelty); the subtle but powerful effect a well-developed idea (conceptual impact or
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cleverness); the utility or appropriateness of the item to the task presented; the level of
inventiveness or advance in the state of the art represented (inventive step); the level of
experience and creative skills required to accomplish the concept as reflected in the finished
product (artisanship); or the delivery and impact of an entry that elevates it above the others
during assessment (execution). Of particular note was the participants’ belief that creativity
requires a confluence of many elements, some of which might be missed or ignored by a novice:
I think someone without the right level of experience would miss the subtle aspects of
something really creative, probably stopping at the point of execution, without digging
deeper into the idea. Judges who don’t have a lot of experience won’t understand the
amount of effort and difficulty required to make something new and conceptually
interesting, they might think what they are seeing was easy to do but someone with a lot of
experience in a creative field would know how hard that would be to pull off. (James).
A majority of the participants explained how experience in a creative field alone is insufficient to
attain the level of expertise necessary to effectively judge creative products and ideas—that
assessing creativity requires extensive experience in evaluating and analyzing the work of others
during the creative development process. Several participants also questioned whether someone
experienced in only one aspect of creative design could effectively judge the creativity of a
completely different type of product or area of specialty, e.g., whether technical expertise in
website design could be effectively transferred in judging creative photography. The participants
who raised these concerns said a true expert in a creative field must have a combination of
extensive experience working as a creative and many years deliberately practicing, getting
feedback, and learning how to develop and evaluate creativity in different forms to be an
effective judge of creativity:
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I think judges who don’t have much experience haven’t seen as much as a seasoned
professional, and so they’re pretty impressionable. They don’t have the knowledge maybe,
and the skill sets on how a lot of things are done, and they get a little too excited just
because, to a novice, everything is new and fresh and cool. But just being in the business
for 30 years isn’t enough; if they haven’t mastered the craft they shouldn’t be judges,
because they don’t take it as seriously as a master. (David)
For me, judgment is a trained muscle, and it comes from knowledge, experience and
discipline. It’s all of those things, it’s literally a trained muscle that allows me to recognize
instantly whether what I have in front of me meets all the criteria, and that only occurs over
time. (Bill)
It’s not enough to know how to create something, you have to learn how to critique
design…how to tear it down and know what’s missing, what can be changed and added, to
make it better. If it’s as good as it can be, then you can say it’s truly creative. (Angela)
It takes a lot longer, a lot more work for a junior person to see the difference between
something that is pretty good and something that’s really good. It is just years of
disciplined thinking and practice…and getting feedback from others in order to get the
perspective to know what’s great and what isn’t. (Jeremy)
Several participants also commented on how consistent past groups of expert judges had been at
identifying the most creative work in prior contests where the participants had been on the
judging panel, even when that panel had not judged as a group before and each originated from
vastly different creative fields, countries, and cultures:
If you get ten judges together and every one of them is an industry professional they [tend
to be very consistent]; but yet they all have very different backgrounds as far as their own
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creative insights or their own intuition or why they decide something is visually pleasing
or not. [Even though] it’s a personal decision, I feel if you have enough people coming
together with the right background… that you will get a fairly fair judgment out of it.
(Fritz)
Most people who are at a level where they’re going to be picked to judge an awards show,
I mean they’re—in theory—at the very top of their game, and so you’ve got a whole bunch
of people who are the very best, very Type A. But the outcome is 99 times out of a 100
still going to be very consistent for the top awards. (James)
Everything is subjective, obviously, and if you get a room full of people together they can’t
even figure out what to get on a pizza. But if you have eight people who are strong
personalities and great in their respective fields at what they do, if the work is that good
and in this contest it is, the cream always rises. (Leonard)
If you can’t stop thinking about an entry or can’t wait to talk to other people about it, that’s
one I would give the highest score to. I think it’s tricky because the volume of entries is
daunting, and you start to get tired…things start to meld together. But there are usually
four or five overall that are just clearly the best. And at the end of the show, all the judges
got together, and it was amazing how much we all agreed that those four or five items were
among the best. We had totally different backgrounds and different personal aesthetics,
with people from different countries and different cultures on the panel, and yet we
gravitated towards the same items without even knowing it. (Amy)
There’s an old expression that is: a judge’s opinion can change by what he ate for
breakfast. And so it is totally subjective, and I’ve often wondered if I went back a week
later or a month later or a even a year later with the exact same work, if I would give it the
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exact same marks. And in most cases, if the work is that fantastic, a top award winner, I
think the yes, I would. (David).
As will be discussed in Chapter 4.3 below, the judges’ actual scores for this contest, and for
seven prior contests, were analyzed for inter-rater reliability to test the judges’ beliefs about the
consistency and reliability of group scoring. While the judges’ scores for those eight different
contests showed a high level of inter-rater reliability, their agreement did not reach the “very
high” level some participants might have assumed. The possible reasons for this are discussed in
Section 5 below.
Finding 5: Most participants (7 of 12 [58%]) acknowledged using various heuristics or
rules of thumb to judge entries and were aware of several types of biases that might affect their
judgment; however, participants also believed they were able to reduce the effect of most such
biases through their substantial judging experience, deliberate mindfulness of the potential for
biases, and the use of the Consensual Assessment Technique.
I think the honest answer is: I don’t think you can prevent [biases from] affecting your
choices. I think we walk around with those in our head all the time. I want to have an
open mind…but it’s near impossible. You have to be aware of those biases and work
through that and try to be fair with what you’re looking at. (Christine)
As noted above, all judges appeared to deliberately work alone during the event, only
discussing entries after they had been scored. Many of the participants indicated this was part of
their strategy to avoid being “swayed” by other judges’ reactions, which they felt might bias
them to award a higher or lower score. However, many participants also acknowledged that they
tended to review several items in different categories before starting the actual scoring process,
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in order to get a sense of the overall level of creativity in the contest, despite the possibility of
pre-judging entries based on a small initial sample:
At the beginning of the judging process, I’ll skip ahead to get a sense of what’s to come,
but then once I’ve gone through a few categories, I do the rest of them in order. I get a
sense of the kind of submissions the show is getting, and then I start judging the entries.
(James)
I do a quick round-up of the room. Just to see where I want to start and what type of work
is there. I’m not being critical at all at that point. Obviously, certain things catch my eye,
and I’m like, “Wow, that’s really cool, I can’t wait to get to that one. But I try to withhold
judgment and see more of what’s there.” (Leonard)
All the participants expressed awareness of the potential for various biases to impact their
assessment of creativity both in awards contests and in the workplace. However, they agreed
that being mindful of the potential for bias and working hard to assess creativity objectively,
using their past experiences and expertise as guides, reduced the possibility of bias impacting
their ability to identify the most creative products and ideas and score them accordingly.
Importantly, all of the participants also pointed to the fact that they were judging entries
individually, and that their scores would be combined with the scores of other experts as
reassurance that any bias in individual judgments would be effectively rectified in the final
contest score averages.
Most participants also felt the types of biases and heuristics inherent in the judging process
would be more significant, and perhaps insurmountable, challenges for non-experts, particularly
in situations of significant time pressure, high stakes, and uncertainty such as an awards contest:
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One of the things you see [with inexperienced judges] is everyone tends to find something
they fall in love with early on and … everything else systematically is graded lower or
higher against that one. I was guilty of that at first where I would start on print ads or
magazine covers and be like, that’s really cool, and it’s the first thing I saw that was good
so everything else measured against that. To prevent that from happening, I have to
remember how it may have affected me in past situations, just be mindful of the impact
those thoughts can have, and go through the steps that I know will help reduce that kind of
thinking from affecting my decisions. (Amy)
These entries are from real people with real jobs and whether they win or lose this contest
can have a major impact on their career. I have to be very careful to not to get in a rush or
let the work of other entries affect my judgment; each entry has to be considered on its
own merit before it is compared to the others. I keep that in mind as I go through each
one, almost methodically, even if I can only spend ten seconds looking at something, so I
don’t get caught up in being too critical or not critical enough. (Jeremy)
Lastly, participants reported that the use of multiple expert judges, who evaluated all items
independently and based on their extensive judging and industry experience, helped to reduce the
likelihood of impact of pure subjectivity and process biases. Participants embraced and
approved the Consensual Assessment Technique as an appropriate method to judge creativity
and to establish high validity and reliability of results in both contests and professional practice.
IV.3 Judges’ scoring and interrater agreement testing
As described in the methodology chapter, scoring data was obtained from the creativity
awards program that included all entries for the contest of this study and 9 other contests from
2009-2014. In each of those years, the program held separate contests for digital and interactive

100

media at one part of the year, and print media and packaging, etc., at another point, each with
different entries and different judging panels, resulting in two sets of judges’ scores per year.
The data was received in archival form, with the names of the judges made anonymous with
random ID codes, and individual judge’s scores of 0 to 10 assigned to each entry. Due to
apparent errors in the random assignment of some entry numbers, however, only scores from
eight contests, including the contest involved in this study, were suitable for analysis. For the
eight contests included in the analysis, 70 judges scored a total of 8,699 entries. Approval to use
the archival data for research purposes was separately obtained from the university’s Institutional
Review Board.
The purpose of obtaining this scoring data was to test the inter-rater agreement of the
judges over several years. However, to protect judges’ confidentiality, data for all contests over
a five-year period were provided in an anonymous format, and since the participants had acted as
judges in different contests over that five-year period, it was not possible to specifically test the
level of agreement of any single judge or group of judges with other judges in a particular
contest or to compare all of the participants’ scores across contests. Nonetheless, the data
provides interesting insights into the level of agreement expert judges achieve in actual judging
environments over several successive years, in contests where the participants acted as judges at
different points, and allows the results from this field setting to be compared to the results of
published experimental creativity research studies.
In creativity research, Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) analysis is a primary method to
measure inter-rater agreement among judges. ICC may be performed under different models
depending on the raters and the items rated. The model of ICC analysis depends first on whether
the judges form the population of all judges of interest or if they are taken as a random sample of
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all possible judges. Second, the model of ICC depends on whether all subjects or items rated
form the target population or are based on a random sample. Lastly, the model of ICC depends
on the whether the reliability is based on individual ratings or mean ratings of all judges (Shrout
and Fleiss, 1979). These considerations give rise to three different forms of models on which
ICC is based.
One-way random effects model. This model is most appropriate when judges are taken as
a random sample from a population of possible judges, who rate all subjects of interest. In this
model, judges are treated as a random sample, and the focus of interest is a one-factor ANOVA
test to determine whether there is a significant subject effect. This model applies even when the
researcher cannot associate a particular subject with a particular rater because information is
lacking about which judge assigned which score to a subject.
Two-way random effects model. In this model, both judges and subjects are comprised of
random samples from respective populations of judges and subjects. Judges rate all (N) subjects
chosen at random from a population of subjects, and it is known how each judge rated each
subject. In this model, the ICC is interpreted as the proportion of subject added to the judge
variance that is associated with differences among the scores of the subjects. The ICC is
interpreted as generalizable to all possible judges.
Two-way mixed model. In this model, all judges of a population rate a random-sample of
subjects from a well-defined population. This particular model is a mixed model as judges are
treated as fixed effect (not as a random sample of all possible judges) and the targets treated as
random effect in the model. In this model, the ICC coefficient is equivalent to the two-way
random effects model, but the only difference is that ICC computed and tested is not
generalizable beyond the given set of judges.
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For each of the three models, the type of ICC computation method also requires a choice
from two alternatives: (i) whether ICC is to be computed using absolute agreement or (ii) ICC is
to be computed using a consistency approach. Absolute agreement is a measure of whether
judges assign the same absolute score. Absolute agreement is often used when systematic
variability due to raters is relevant. In contrast, the consistency method of ICC computation
measures if ratings are highly correlated, even if they are not identical in absolute terms.
Consistency agreement is often used when systematic variability due to raters is irrelevant. These
alternatives use different versions of the intraclass correlation coefficient—(i) Single measure
reliability where individual ratings constitute the unit of analysis and (ii) Average measure
reliability where the mean of all ratings is the unit of analysis. Average measure reliability is
most appropriate when the research design involves averaging multiple ratings for each item and
using an individual rating would involve too much uncertainty.
For this research study, a two-way random effects Intraclass Correlation model using the
consistency alternative (ICC(2)) was employed to assess the inter-rater agreement in all contests
because both judges and items scored were random samples, and the judges’ scores are averaged
across items to achieve a creativity score for the contest. The 0 to 10 ratings that judges used
were assumed to be interval-level data, and the test statistic follows F distribution. A test of the
significance of the ICC was also performed. The statistical hypothesis formulated to test the
significance of the ICC coefficient is:
Null hypothesis H0: ICC coefficient is not significant (= 0).
Alternate hypothesis H1: ICC coefficient is significant (# 0).
The test for this study is performed using a .05 level of significance, thus the null hypothesis can
be rejected, and the coefficient is considered significant if the p-value of the test is less .05.
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Tables 3 to 11 report descriptive statistics for contests 1 to 8 respectively. The number
(N) of items judged, as well as the minimum score, maximum score, mean, and standard
deviation of scores are reported for each for each judge (identified separately by an anonymous
number2) for each contest.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 1
Judge
N

Minimum

Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

2

2652

0

9

5.72

1.498

3

2648

0

9

5.23

1.853

4

2154

0

9

6.11

2.023

5

2233

0

9

6.17

1.520

6

205

1

8

5.18

1.355

8

1828

0

9

7.10

1.828

9

2034

0

10

4.10

2.503

10

402

5

9

7.97

.869

2

Judge numbers were assigned in the data set by the awards program before receipt by the researcher and were not
in strict numerical order.
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 2
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

11

511

5

9

7.96

.884

12

492

0

9

5.84

1.837

13

511

0

9

4.98

2.380

14

509

1

9

6.62

1.730

15

504

1

9

6.50

1.897

16

512

0

9

5.58

2.677

23

651

0

9

4.73

2.036

24

487

0

9

4.72

2.122

25

501

0

9

5.16

2.616

26

411

1

9

5.63

1.767

105

Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 3
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

28

511

1

9

4.54

2.080

29

558

1

9

6.01

1.443

31

527

1

10

4.99

2.006

32

511

1

9

4.42

2.105

33

538

2

9

5.57

1.610

34

530

1

9

6.41

1.356

39

636

1

10

5.95

1.526

40

583

1

9

5.15

1.727

41

649

1

9

4.90

2.199

______________________________________________________________
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 4
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

46

1336

1

9

5.21

1.766

47

1321

1

10

4.43

2.215

51

1269

1

10

5.06

2.363

52

1326

1

10

5.57

1.662

53

1331

2

10

6.32

1.550

55

1332

1

10

4.97

2.254

56

1305

1

10

5.18

1.848

57

1334

3

10

7.62

1.415

_____________________________________________________________
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 5
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

70

978

1

9

5.56

1.296

71

966

1

10

4.84

1.732

72

982

1

10

3.62

2.258

73

983

0

10

4.75

2.250

74

937

3

10

6.15

1.243

75

981

1

10

5.12

2.483

76

977

1

10

5.80

2.222

77

970

1

10

5.44

1.892

78

976

1

10

6.31

1.530

79

915

2

10

5.68

2.301
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Table 9 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 6
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

76

465

1

9

6.44

1.571

80

487

1

10

5.15

2.103

81

487

1

10

4.93

1.782

82

381

1

10

7.16

1.512

83

487

1

10

7.15

1.973

85

487

1

9

5.85

1.808

86

487

2

10

7.07

1.972

87

481

1

10

6.85

1.478
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Table 10 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 7
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

29

913

1

10

5.89

2.671

88

956

1

10

5.03

2.700

90

964

1

10

5.61

2.886

91

977

1

10

5.21

1.688

92

951

0

10

4.60

1.540

93

969

2

10

4.36

1.658

94

927

1

10

4.91

1.857

95

963

1

10

4.90

1.603

96

955

1

10

5.82

1.413

97

971

1

10

5.36

3.140
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Table 11 Descriptive Statistics for Scores of Items in Contest 8
Judge
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std.
Deviation

105

859

1

10

6.61

1.687

106

854

1

10

8.26

1.258

107

863

1

10

6.02

2.474

108

861

1

10

5.30

1.931

109

835

1

10

5.39

1.516

110

858

1

9

5.96

1.583

112

864

1

10

4.60

1.951

The inter-rater agreement analysis was performed using the IBM SPSS version 19.0 software
application applying a two-way random effects model (ICC(2)) consistent with recommendations
of Shrout & Fleiss (1979). Listwise deletion of missing values was employed as the default in
SPSS to handle instances of missing data.
The summary of the ICC analysis is presented in Table 12. In this table, summary of the
computed ICC coefficient along with the test for its significance is reported for both single and
average measure types of computation of ICC. In addition, 95% confidence intervals for the ICC
coefficient along with the F statistic and the associated p value is reported.

111

Table 12 Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
95% Confidence Interval

F Test (True Value
0)

Lower
Bound

Upper Bound

Value

P value

.177

.333

4.036

<.001

.674

.563

.750

4.036

Contest 2 Single Measures .360

.284

.430

6.371

.797

.735

.841

6.371

Contest 3 Single Measures .294

.247

.341

3.390

.676

.621

.721

3.390

Contest 4 Single Measures .260

.201

.318

5.418

.759

.694

.808

5.418

Contest 5 Single Measures .271

.229

.313

5.559

.788

.748

.820

5.559

Contest 6 Single Measures .277

.206

.350

5.333

.754

.675

.811

5.333

Contest 7 Single Measures .188

.165

.214

3.462

.699

.665

.731

3.462

Contest 8 Single Measures .250

.162

.336

4.880

.574

.780

4.880

Contest

Intraclass
Correlation

Contest 1 Single Measures .256
Average
Measures

Average
Measures

Average
Measures

Average
Measures

Average
Measures

Average
Measures

Average
Measures

Average
Measures

.700

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
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For each of the contests, the F test for the significance of the ICC coefficient reports p < .05,
indicating a statistically significant positive inter-rater agreement among judges. Average
Measures report the Intraclass Correlation for each contest, with the lowest ICC coefficient at
0.674 for contest 1 and the highest ICC at 0.797 for contest 2. Reliability coefficients of .65 to
.80 are considered to indicate moderate to high agreement in creativity research studies
(Amabile, 1996; Kaufman & Baer, 2012). The ICC coefficients reported translate to an effect
size measure of at least 0.449 (η2 > 0.449). This means the effect size for inter-rater agreement
measure is at least moderate, a further indication of a high (but not very high) degree of
consistency and agreement among judges across items for each of the contests.
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V

DISCUSSION

V.1 Introduction
The purpose of this multi-case field study was to investigate the criteria and processes used
by expert judges in assessing the creativity of professional entries submitted to a creativity award
contest. The study assumes that understanding how domain experts make judgments about
creativity of professional products at awards contests, in situations where judges face significant
time pressure, uncertainty, and ill-defined goals, will provide useful insights into how creativity
is assessed in real-world situations. To conduct this investigation, the study employed
naturalistic inquiry techniques to collect qualitative data through in-depth interviews,
observations, think-aloud and simulation exercises, and used quantitative analysis to test scoring
data. Participants in this study were recognized subject-matter experts in creative industries with
substantial experience judging creativity in both workplace and professional awards contests.
Observation of real-time entry judging and simulation exercises occurred during an actual
awards contest event. Archival data of scores given in the contest observed and in eight prior
creativity award contests over the previous five years were obtained after all awards were
announced. The data qualitative was collected, coded, and analyzed using the conceptual
frameworks identified by a literature review of relevant topics and then reorganized using themes
and concepts that emerged from the data that responded to the research questions.
To explore how domain experts judge the creativity of entries in a professional awards
program, this research investigated the following research questions:
1. What criteria do expert judges of creativity awards contests report using to assess the
creativity of products and ideas; in particular, do experts use the “novel and useful” definition of
creativity that is employed in most creativity research or some other criteria?
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2. What processes do experts use as they judge creativity in contest settings; are the
processes involved in creativity contests similar to or different from those used in the experts’
professional workplace settings?
3. What types of cognitive processing are involved in expert judgment of creative products
and ideas; do experts use intuition, rational analysis, a combination of both, or something else
when judging creativity contests?
4. What do experts say are the differences between how experts and non-experts make
judgments of creativity; what kinds of mistakes might a novice make in judging creativity?
5. What biases and heuristics do expert judges acknowledge encountering when judging
creativity in real-world situations, and how do they attempt to deal with them?
The following section discusses the findings and data collected in this research study and
analyzes the findings as they relate to each specific research question. Contributions to theory
and practice resulting from the research study are also discussed.
V.2 Discussion
V.2.1 Definition and Elements of Creativity

I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that. Justice Potter Stewart, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964), conc. op. [emphasis added].
The question of how to define, identify and measure creativity has plagued researchers for
more than 50 years, almost as long ago as when Justice Potter wrote the famous passage above
categorizing obscenity as: “I know it when I see it.” The results of this research suggest that, at
least for domain experts, the answer to whether something is creative is similarly explained: they
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simply know it when they see it although, by strict definition, they could not have seen it before
because it did not exist, i.e., it had not been created. How domain experts know creativity when
they “see it”—the criteria they apply and the processes they undertake to assess creativity—has
no such ready answer.
The primary question for this research of ‘how to define creativity’ arose in response to
concerns raised in literature suggesting that inconsistent and potentially contradictory results in
creativity research might be due to a misalignment between the two-item construct definition
used to describe creativity, on the one hand, and the unitary operational definition of creativity
often used to measure the dependent variable of creative output. The results of this research
study indicate that domain experts do not agree with either the two-item “novel and useful”
construct or the unitary operational definition of creativity common in creativity research. In
fact, participants specifically rejected the “novel and useful” definition of creativity widely
adopted in research as being too simplistic, incomplete and inadequate in practice, and strongly
questions the viability of that definition for research purposes.
In practice, the participants in this study reported using a minimum of three key factors to
define, identify and measure professional creative output: 1) novelty; 2) inventiveness; and 3)
task appropriateness. The weight of the data collected indicates novelty, inventiveness and task
appropriateness are formative, elemental factors that are minimally necessary to identify and
sufficiently measure the construct of creative output. Moreover, the participants identified three
additional aspects they look for in the assessment and measurement of creativity, expecting to
identify at least one of the following three criteria: 4) cleverness; 5) artisanship; and 6)
execution. Some participants viewed the additional criteria as comprising the balance of six
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formative elements of the creativity construct, while others viewed the additional aspects as
second-order or perhaps reflective measures of the first three more formative factors.
Creativity domain experts also do not appear to use either intuition or rational analysis alone
in reaching their judgments of creative output. Instead, participants reported and were observed
applying a two-step or an iterative process: 1) a relatively immediate holistic recognition and
binary decision that an item is or is not highly creative; and 2) either a very brief confirmatory
analysis, if an item was determined to be not highly creative, or a more extensive analysis of
highly creative items. In both cases, judges appeared to apply non-consciously the three-item
criterion to all items assessed, and applied the multi-faceted six-factor measurement construct to
assess the comparative level of creativity to more creative items, and award a final score.
In the first immediate assessment step, participants made it clear that novelty alone does not
make an item creative: the item must represent a significant creative departure from existing
products or ideas. This makes logical sense given that just because something is “new” or
previously unseen does make it creative. It may be the rater has not seen the exact item before
but recognizes it as an easily anticipated or a logical extension of an existing product or idea, i.e.,
“obvious”. For example, adding a third hole to two-hole punched paper for the first time might
be new and even novel compared to the state of the art of paper products at the time, but that
alone does not make it creative. For an item to be considered creative, participants stated they
required it to be novel and not an obvious extension of an existing product or idea; it must be
unique, different, novel, and unexpected. In other words, it must represent an inventive step—
enough of a departure from the current state of the art to surprise, astonish or challenge the
expert judge’s expectations. Lastly, more than mere “utility”, experts reported a creative item
must respond both appropriately and substantially to the creative task presented.
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Once judges identified an item as exhibiting some level of creativity using the first three
criteria, participants reported the amount of time and effort involved in determining whether and
to what extent the item is highly creative depends on the complexity of the item, the degree of
departure from the “state of the art”, and the perceived difficulty in execution. This requires
assessment of the cleverness of the item’s idea or approach, the degree of artisanship exhibited
by the finished product, and the elegance and impact of the execution. Thus, whether considered
as additional factors of the main construct or as second-order reflective measures, most
participants indicated that some or all three additional factors needed to be present to identify
and measure an item as highly creative.
“Creativity” is more than just being different. Anybody can play weird; that’s easy. What’s
hard is to be as simple as Bach. Making the simple, awesomely simple, that’s creativity.
- Charles Mingus, Jazz composer, performer and pioneer (1922-1979).
For those participants who viewed the three additional measures as second-order or
reflective factors, the elements appeared to help identify or qualify the main factors. For
example, many participants indicated that cleverness could be viewed as either an extension or a
more granular measure of novelty (where cleverness denotes a high degree of novelty) or
inventiveness (as some degree of cleverness would be expected in an inventive step and, the
more clever, the more inventive). Conversely, many of the participants noted that cleverness can
be and often is a separately assessed element. For example, where two similar items are each
novel and also to the same degree an inventive step forward in the state of the art, the degree of
cleverness of each would allow an expert judge to distinguish between the two and rate one
higher than the other. Likewise, artisanship and execution might be considered extensions of the
concept of appropriateness to the task in some instances, although during the simulations and
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task analysis exercises all respondents reported something much more significant than mere task
utility must be present to identify an item as creative—the item must be both appropriate to the
task and also elegantly and meaningfully deliver on the concept. As one participant put it: “If
it’s done technically correct, maybe it’s perfect, but if falls flat on the messaging or it’s boring, it
doesn’t communicate, then it shouldn’t win an award.” (David). Thus, it remains an open
question whether artisanship and execution are additional formative factors necessary for a
finding of creativity, or reflective measures used to measure the extent of achievement of task
appropriateness.3
Interestingly, the six factors identified by the participants in this study closely resemble the
elements of creativity suggested more than 50 years ago by Jackson & Messick (1965) in their
four-item definition of creativity: 1) unusual when compared to other products; 2) appropriate to
the context; 3) representing a shift in the constraints and boundaries of the situation; and 4) able
to condense both simplicity and complexity. A minority of researchers have similarly argued for
a three-factor definition of creativity that incorporates the elements of surprise, non-obviousness
or inventiveness similar to the three-part test used by the Patent Offices of the United States and
the United Kingdom to assess patent applications (Barton, 2003; Boden 2004; Simonton 2013).
3

The following are other words participants used when attempting to describe each of the
six key indicators, as generated by a word usage analysis drawn from interview transcripts and
researcher observation notes:
Novel: unique, different, diverse, unusual, distinctive.
Inventive: surprising, unexpected, progressive, astonishing, unlikely, unforeseen, not
obvious.
Appropriate: useful, functional, utility, fit-for-purpose, meaningful.
Clever: interesting, inspiring, appealing, compelling, conceptual, ideation,
provocative, radical, exciting, extraordinary, daring, bold.
Artisanship: quality, commonsensical, beautiful, elegant, simplified, excellence, artistic,
superior.
Execution: Delivery, achievement, challenge, success, realization, impactful.

119

The explanations provided by the participants in this study help to expand on those conceptual
discussions by identifying and refining the factors suggested by researchers into the six factors
identified as used in practice. The results of this research strongly suggest the definition of
creativity, and the criteria used to assess creative outputs, needs to be expanded in research to
include at a minimum a third criterion of non-obviousness, surprise or an inventive step. In
addition, participants stated usefulness fails to capture the of utility sufficiently; appropriateness
to the task allows for a more complete assessment, particularly in professional settings.
Moreover, this research indicates that the other factors—cleverness, artisanship and execution—
are either formative elements or reflective measures of creativity in practice, and that additional
research is needed to determine if these factors are also necessary to more completely define and
measure creativity in research.
V.2.2 Processes Used by Experts in the Field
The participants in this study reported they use almost exactly the same processes, criteria
and standards to judge creativity in contest environments that they use in the workplace. One of
the key differences between the two environments related to the time available to process an item
and the evaluator’s ability to put context around the item. Participants indicated the complexity
of the items reviewed is one way the judgment process is significantly slowed down in a contest
setting; more complex items require more time to evaluate and score. However, most
participants reported that taking additional time to review an item rarely, if ever, caused the
initial assessment or score to improve. In fact, most participants indicated additional time spent
examining an item in a contest setting usually resulted in a lowering of the initial score. One
possible explanation is that more time reviewing an item allowed the judge to be more critical,
using a more analytic reasoning process to overcome initial intuitive impressions. There is no
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evidence in this study, however, to indicate that analytic reasoning resulted in a more “correct”
score, and it is likely judges avoided unnecessary analysis as a way to prevent bias from
affecting their judgment. Moreover, not having as much information about a contest item as one
might have about an item in a workplace setting was not seen as detrimental to the validity or
reliability of assessments in contests. In fact, participants believed creativity is more easily
identified when directly and contemporaneously assessed against multiple items—a situation that
rarely occurs in practice.
There is also no evidence from this study to suggest the judges used any formulaic or
arithmetic approach to the evaluation of creative output, other than the ranking effect of choosing
a score to give an item. And there is no evidence to suggest expert judges require additional
instruction or direction to use a specific criterion. In many of the studies reviewed prior to this
research, researchers instructed participants to use either a single item construct (i.e., creative) or
a two or three factor construct including novelty and usefulness, to assess creative products or
ideas. However, this research clearly shows that experts do not expressly rely on novelty and
usefulness alone, and do not appear to (and reported they did not) separately weight novelty,
usefulness or any other criteria when evaluating creativity. This suggests experts assess
creativity using a multi-dimensional holistic model to reach a scaled ultimate unitary decision
without conscious processing or scoring of individual factors.
V.2.3 Applicability of the Consensual Assessment Technique
This research also supports Amabile’s Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) as a valid
method in the process of evaluating creative output in both practice and research. Experts
reported their assessment process followed the same general requirements outlined by Amabile
for CAT evaluation (a group of domain experts, judging each item independently and without
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specific instructions) and they were observed following those same processes in scoring items in
the actual contest. The only instructions given the judges during the observed contest were an
outline of the scoring scale to be used and specifics on how to enter scores electronically. CAT
presumes domain experts have the requisite experience and understanding to recognize and
assess creative output without pre-defined criteria or instructions, and if acting independently
they will achieve a high level of agreement on the measure of creativity. Although CAT has
been defined as using a “unitary” operational construct to measure creativity, in practice it
appears domain experts applying CAT non-consciously rely instead on a multi-factor construct.
Whether an item is creative, or more creative than another, is likely the final measure of the
output’s combined novelty, inventiveness, and appropriateness to the task, along with some
measure of cleverness, artisanship and execution.
In summary, the evidence developed by this research suggests experts reach an initial binary
conclusion (creative or not) and then assign a score reflecting a relative comparison of the level
of creativity against other items either in the assessed set or against the expert’s own experience
and knowledge of the state of the art. In practice, this research also highlights the importance of
using experienced professionals to identify creative output to determine which ideas and
products to pursue, something business organizations find difficult to accomplish consistently
(Harvey & Kou, 2013).
V.2.4 Cognitive Processing (CEST and CCT)
Participants in this study acknowledged that creativity triggers an immediate emotional
response and, in many cases almost simultaneously, an abbreviated form of analysis occurs as
part of the evaluator’s assessment. Thus, the evidence generated by this research tends to
support both Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and Cognitive Continuum Theory
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(CCT) in the context of how expertise-based intuition and rational analysis operates in evaluating
creative output in practice. Both CEST and CCT recognize expertise-based intuition and rational
analysis as components of evaluative cognition. However, CEST posits rational analysis and
intuition operate either in direct opposition or at different times during the evaluation process.
CCT, on the other hand, theorizes that intuition and rational analysis exist on a continuum and
operate simultaneously, in varying respective degrees, in response to task stimuli. Both theories
are supported by the findings of this research but the study failed to provide sufficient definitive
evidence to differentiate between them, as each model adequately explains the results obtained.
As noted in the Findings chapter, participant judges appeared to use intuition for most of the
initial assessments generated during the contest judging event. Moreover, all participants either
acknowledged “intuition” was a critical component of their judgment process or reported
experiencing several of the indicators of intuitive decision making such as using their “gut”
instinct or reaching a decision with little time to fully consider each item. Participants also were
observed moving very quickly through each entry, in most cases spending less than two seconds
viewing each before entering a score. Participants also identified several aspects of their process
consistent with theories of intuition, including sudden awareness of an idea or choice without
conscious awareness of the source, affect-laden decisions often coupled with strong emotional or
physical reactions, and high confidence in their judgments (many saying they rarely if ever go
back to reconsider their decision). Other participants used the words “visceral reaction” to
describe their judgments during the evaluation phase.
However, many of the participants also said they were on occasion concerned their fast and
easily achieved decisions may not be accurate and that additional time and “cognitive effort”
were sometimes required to determine whether their first “impressions” were accurate.
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Participants reported that occasionally the additional time spent on review would uncover issues
causing them to award a lower final score than first intended. None of the judges indicated that
additional time spent on an entry resulted in a higher score. These findings suggest a two-step
serial process as predicted by CEST whereby judges use the default mode of processing for the
majority of decisions that match a particular item with a pattern or experience from long-term
memory. However, when an entry is complex or initially considered particularly creative, a
switch in processing can occur, causing the participant to apply the slower, more cognitively
involved effort of rational thought.
The findings also support the predictions of CCT that in many cases intuition and rational
thinking occur simultaneously as “quasirationality” in response to the demands of complex
decision tasks. Entering scores for each item often took judges longer than the time required to
review the item, and many items appeared to be scored “in bulk” for this reason. However, in
some cases, particularly when an item contained multiple parts or dimensions, judges spent
additional time looking at the entry more holistically, in an apparent attempt to take in the overall
concept or execution of the item. In most of these cases, judges still moved very quickly and
deliberately, reviewing each item, scoring them and moving on. Judges reported that items
receiving low scores (5 or less) were reviewed for the least amount of time, while items that
received high scores (8 or above) were not only reviewed for a longer period of time (ten or more
seconds), but often judges were seen contemplating the item from multiple perspectives. Judges
later explained the additional time was often spent “admiring” a particularly creative item they
had already decided would receive a very high (9 or10) score. When asked to explain their
overall scoring system and the criteria they were using in these specific instances, participants
could not verbalize their reasoning saying they would have to “dumb it down” to an elementary
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explanation. However, all participants agreed the process used in these cases did not involve
conscious switching or toggling from one processing mode to another. In fact, many judges
reported their process involved both a holistic appreciation for the item, in tandem with a more
critical appreciation for discrete elements of the execution and approach, and that their thought
process involved “searching” for the right response to the item presented. This suggests judges
were not operating solely in one mode or the other, as predicted by CEST, but were moving
along a continuum between rational analysis and emotional intuitive response to reach a decision
that matched the stimulus, as theorized by CCT.
Evidence from this research also suggests that the two theories may describe different
aspects of the same overall process. During observations, judges exhibited signs suggesting they
may have been operating in a binary “off-on” approach, using intuition to quickly assess whether
an item deserved further consideration. When an item elicited an intuitive response, judges
appeared to then shift into a more holistic review of the item, but not into a purely analytical
review. Participants reported that even when they identified an item as creative, the initial
emotional response did not disappear as they continued to review the item in more detail, and
that they did not recall critically analyzing an item unless intuitively they felt something wasn’t
quite complete. In many instances reported by the participants and observed during the judging
and simulations, judges were unable to identify why a particular item was considered highly
creative, but very often they could readily identify why an item might not receive a higher score.
This suggests judges were using a continuum approach to processing along with a form of
pattern matching. Judges first compared the item against their memory and observed
immediately if the item matched their past experience (i.e., was not new or different) requiring
no movement along the continuum (due to having reached a successful decision outcome) and
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they awarded a low or middle score. If the item did not match the judge’s past experience or
memory, a shift to a different processing approach was required to consider the item further (due
to decision failure). All of the participants indicated a more complex form of decision-making
was involved in this “second look.” However, none of the judges exhibited and none of the
participants reported that they toggled into a purely analytic mode.
This task-centered response and movement along a continuum until an acceptable choice is
found supports CCT’s quasirationailty movement model, but does not exclude the CCT model.
In fact, most participants indicated they had used both approaches, at different times or for
different categories, suggesting both theories may adequately describe the process of creative
evaluation and that the research methodology employed here was insufficient to identify the
boundary conditions of either. Likewise, it could be that both processes are available to experts
and are used for different purposes or in different contexts to assess creativity. “If there are two
models that both agree with observation…then one cannot say that one is more real than
another.” (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010: 46).
V.2.5 Recognition Primed Decision-Making and Expert Intuition
Regardless of whether CEST or CCT, or both, are involved, the evidence strongly supports
experts utilize one or more of the variants of the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model
when assessing creative products and ideas. Interestingly, the participants appeared to use the
opposite of “pattern-matching” and “consistency with prior experience” that are the hallmarks of
most variants of RPD. For creative products, most participants reported they evaluated entries
very quickly, using both intuition and an abbreviated analysis to determine that the expert had
not seen the item, i.e., that the item was outside of the expert’s stored memory or recent

126

experience, before assessing the qualities of novelty and cleverness. In short, the participants
appeared to look for what did not fit a pattern or was inconsistent with expectation.
Participants then appeared to use story-building to simulate and evaluate the creative steps
that might have been taken to develop the item (to assess inventiveness, artisanship and
execution), and lastly participants incorporated forward-chain reasoning to extend the simulation
into future scenarios to evaluate the likelihood of success of the product or idea (to assess
functionality, task appropriateness, and concept delivery). Highly creative items would then
require “progressive deepening” of simulation and comparison, and extended imagination, in
order to complete forward chain reasoning. By definition, “forward-chaining” requires assuming
some aspects of an item as a given (the “if”) and extending those aspects into the future until an
imagined solution is achieved (the “then”). Forward chaining is not rational analysis where
various “options” are considered against each other using logic to derive a superior solution. In
RPD and forward-chaining used by experts, only one “option” is simulated, using imagination in
an attempt to recreate the solution presented.
In this research study, all participants appeared to utilize some variant of RPD to identify
and assess items they had intuitively determined were creative and worthy of further assessment.
This evidence supports Klein’s model of RPD as being “a blend of intuition and analysis. The
pattern matching is the intuitive part, and the mental simulation is the conscious, deliberate, and
analytical part.” (Klein, 2008: 458). In a fashion, RPD helps to explain how both CEST and
CCT may be involved in cognitive processing in uncertain, ambiguous, time-sensitive and nonalgorithmic tasks. As pointed out by other researchers, the process of “intuiting” is rapid (often
instantaneous), spontaneous (without effort and unable to be controlled) and alogical (not
necessarily contradicting the rules of logic but may not follow them either) (Dorfler &
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Ackermann, 2012). Intuition is ineffective in decision-making involving algorithmic tasks that
can be decomposed and solved logically, sequentially, or mathematically but can be highly
effective in non-algorithmic tasks (Dane, Rockmann & Pratt, 2012). RPD is also less effective in
situations presenting highly combinatorial or algorithmic problems, where justifications are
required, or in cases where differing views of multiple stakeholders must be considered (Klein,
1998). In this study, the quantitative analysis of judges’ scores also supports the conclusion that
domain experts with significant experience (from “high-fidelity” environments) utilizing expert
intuition and consensual assessment techniques achieve more reliable and valid results in nonalgorithmic tasks than non-experts. These results also might explain why organizations that
assess creativity in group settings make less effective decisions—whenever justifications are
required or multiple stakeholder views must be considered, expert intuition is likely to be
curtailed or ineffective.
V.2.6 Expert v. Novice
All of the participants in this study expressed the opinion that novices would struggle to
consistently identify and score highly creative work. Participants identified several reasons for
the challenges novices would face, including: a) an incomplete awareness of the “state of the art”
(lack of domain familiarity); b) the absence of understanding the work effort involved in the
varying levels of artisanship required to produce highly creative work (lack of creative
experience); c) the relatively small amount of judging experience (lack of discernment skill),
and d) the lack of experience with heuristics and biases (lack of debiasing skill) that would result
in personal subjectivity and emotional responses going unanalyzed. In essence, participants
believed novices would unrealistically assume their abilities to assess creativity were greater than
their experience would allow and succumb to untrained emotional responses. Some participants
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termed this gap of knowledge and experience the “novice trap” or referred to the novice’s
“inability to know what they don’t know.” In psychology, this cognitive bias is termed the
Dunning-Kruger Effect and explains the difficulty inexperienced individuals have in recognizing
their own lack of knowledge and the overconfidence in decision making that often results
(Dunning, et al., 2003).
Participants also described several ways the challenges would likely inhibit the ability of a
novice judge to assess creativity effectively. First and foremost, the participants identified the
risk of “premature convergence” or accepting the most easily identified response and failing to
see additional potential solutions. Premature convergence is more likely in tasks with short-time
frames and in complex environments, particularly where the decision-maker lacks experience in
the task and has limited breadth of understanding of the field. For novice judges, the time
pressures and lack of experience creates the risk they would seek out only items that appear very
different from the rest of the field and select those items as highly creative without further
evaluation. Participants also indicated that a lack of experience would cause novices to not
recognize “rough creativity”, i.e., creative work that is not fully polished but which exhibits all
of the traits of creativity except execution and artisanship. One example of this challenge in
practice would be highly creative formative work that needs further development and which is so
divergent a novice would assume it would be impossible to achieve. Experts, on the other hand,
would be able to identify the potentiality of such rough creativity and understand how it might be
implemented in the future.
The participants not only identified the necessity of using domain experts to ensure the
validity and reliability of creativity assessment, the experts’ descriptions of the processes and
criteria used to identify highly creative work in contest settings also reveals some of the reasons
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behind this necessity. Faced with the significant time pressures, uncertainty and ambiguity of a
high-stakes creativity contest, experts must rely on various heuristics in order to accomplish the
tasks timely. However, the use of heuristics also creates the potential for the impact of numerous
biases to alter the results. The methods used by experts as expressed by the participants in this
study not only serve to accomplish a great deal in a short period of time, but as explained in the
next section, also help to reduce the frequency and the impact of bias on the decisions made.
Non-experts lack the experience necessary to appropriately utilize heuristics and to identify and
avoid biases that would result.
V.2.7 Using Heuristics and Avoiding Biases
Participants in this study acknowledged using heuristics to judge creativity in high-pressure,
low-time environments, and all acknowledged numerous potential biases that could adversely
affect their judgment and decision-making. Participants identified a number of biases novices
would encounter in judging creativity that they would struggle to recognize and deal with
effectively, including: availability, typicality, anchoring, and confirmation bias. Novices without
experience in the relevant domain, lacking awareness of the processes and criteria necessary for
valid assessment, and inexperienced in the process of judging and preventing biases from
affecting their decisions, are ill equipped to provide reliable judgments in the face of these
challenges. However, the participants reported several techniques they relied upon to reduce the
likelihood and impact of biases.
Several participants identified “mindfulness” as a significant method used to avoid the
impact of biases or predisposition on decisions, by having full consciousness of the situation, the
importance of the work to the contestants, and the value of the contribution to the overall
profession of creativity. As one participant explained:

130

“These contests are really important to the participants, and I have to do my very best to
make good decisions and not let my own subjective opinions or the feelings of others affect
my judgment. I approach these [contests] with a high degree of awareness of the ultimate
goal is: identifying the most creative and worthwhile work.” [Edward]
Other participants indicated they felt that prior contest judging and professional work experience
had improved their ability to avoid certain biases from creeping into their decisions. For many,
the same experience gained in the “high-fidelity” environment of a contest, coupled with the
immediate feedback of judging professional work, in which they developed expertise in the
domain also trained them to recognize bias and debias their judgments. Indeed, training and
expertise gained from practical experience, along with having empathy for the individuals the
decision will impact, have been shown to improve “debiasing” in decision-making (Dhami,
2013).
Participants also pointed out the importance of staying abreast of other creativity awards
contest outcomes and the creative work published in their respective industries as well as other
fields as a means of avoiding subjectivity and other potential biases. Many participants
specifically reported that critically assessing the creative work of others outside of the
participant’s own professional work and contests in which they acted as judges was a way of
keeping an open mind and avoiding “group-think.”
While participants acknowledged that time pressures often required the use of heuristics to
complete assessment of creativity in practice that could lead to bias in judgment, most felt
“mindfulness” of the potential biases, awareness of their personal subjectivities, and use of some
form of analysis to confirm or discount initial reactions, all helped experienced judges avoid or
reduce the likelihood of incorrect biases in their judgments. Kahneman acknowledged that
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intuition can produce valid and accurate judgments and decisions but only in situations where
domain expertise overcomes inherent biases caused by heuristics (Kahneman, 2011). This study
supports the concept that domain expertise can overcome inherent biases where that expertise is
obtained and maintained in “high-fidelity environments,” and where the judgments and decisions
surround tasks that are non-algorithmic.
V.2.8 Inter-rater Agreement of Judges Scores
As noted in the Findings section, inter-rater correlation of judging scores across eight
contests over multiple years were calculated at a low of 0.674 and a high of .797. ICC scores of
reliability between .65 and .80 are considered to reflect a moderate to high degree of agreement
in creativity research. However, considering the level of domain expertise and relative
homogeny of items assessed in the creativity contest, the judges’ interrater correlations could be
criticized for not being even higher. As pointed out in the literature review, fewer numbers of
experts have been shown to achieve a high level of inter-rater agreement compared to the
number of novices necessary to achieve a similar rating (Kaufman, et al., 2008). However,
assessing creativity by its nature is a human-based non-algorithmic process with no clear
objective determinant, and therefore anything nearing total agreement among multiple judges is
unachievable. In fact, had the correlation of the judges’ scores been higher than .80, the research
results would be suspect for being too highly correlated. All of the work assessed was at a very
high professional level—presumably the contest entries had been pre-selected as highly creative
by the entrants, all of whom were creative professionals. Despite this, judges’ scores on
individual entries ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 10. Given that experienced professionals
created the work judged in a field setting, it would be unlikely, and highly suspect, if the judges’
scores achieved a very high level of agreement. To achieve very high correlations one would
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expect only one or a few items in each category to be scored as highly creative with the
remaining items scoring well below the top items along a normal distribution, allowing for
complete discrimination across the top, middle and bottom ranges. In situations where
professional work is being judged, however, less variation would be expected among the items
scored with clustering near the very top of the range, making high inter-rater agreement much
more difficult to achieve. Accordingly, score correlations above .70 for highly creative products
across a small number of raters would not be expected unless the assessments were in fact highly
reliable.
V.3 Contributions to Theory And Practice
This field study contributes to the development of creativity research and the understanding
of process models of judgment and decision-making in several ways. First, through the
observation and in-depth inquiry of the processes and criteria that expert judge participants used
in assessing creative entries, this research develops evidence highlighting the critical role experts
must play in the measurement of creative output in research. The experts observed in this
research revealed unique and special processes and approaches to the evaluation of creative
products that appear to be very fast and highly effective, without the need for special instruction
or significant support. Moreover, the participants’ judgments of the entries appeared to be highly
valid as shown by the tight consensus on the choices of winning entries and highly reliable as
shown by the results of inter-rater reliability testing on the participants’ actual scoring and the
scores given by judges in prior contests.
Second, participants identified several deficiencies in the operational and construct
definitions of creativity often used in creativity research. Participants provided evidence
suggesting that a holistic unitary measure of creativity, applying multiple facets that may be
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different depending on the item assessed, is more effective for experts in assessing creative
products in practice. Because of their years of experience evaluating creative products and ideas,
experts appear to be able to identify the key components of creativity for a particular item or,
perhaps more correctly, identify when key elements are missing or poorly executed. While it is
tempting to seize upon the key elements and components identified by the participants as
indicative of creativity in order to create a list for potential use by non-experts, it is important to
remember that this study involved only a small number of participant judges in the think-aloud
and simulation exercises that generated those key elements identified. And each of the
participants made clear that judging a different group of items would likely involve different
combinations of elements and components, such that not all should be considered necessary or
important for every creative product or idea. Moreover, none of the experts felt non-experts
would be able to apply specific criteria. It was only by means of the expert participants’
experience and deliberate practice that they had learned what to look for in which situations, and
what allows experts to “know it when they see it.”
Third, this research potentially highlights some of the context and reasons behind
quantitative research showing the stark differences in performance between experts and nonexperts when judging creativity. Studies have shown that non-experts’ assessments of creativity
in small groups cannot be considered reliable or valid, and that it can take as many as a 100 nonexperts to achieve an inter-rater reliability equal to just a few experts. This research provides
additional evidence of the challenges inherent in using non-experts by identifying some of the
reasons non-experts would struggle to evaluate creativity and achieve reliable results.
The participants’ behavior and processes also contribute to understanding the cognitive
processing of experts during decision making in general, and of Cognitive-Experiential Self-
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Theory and Cognitive Continuum Theory in particular. CEST and CCT both recognize the
existence and effective use of intuition by experts, but the mechanisms by which this occurs are
not well understood. The results of this study provide insights into expert decision-making
behavior and their perceptions about evaluating creative products in a field setting.
This field study also contributes to practice by identifying ways to improve the assessment
of creativity in organizations. Managers of organizations struggle to differentiate creativity,
innovation or problem solving, often incorrectly viewing the three separate constructs as
inextricably connected (Banks, et al., 2002). Organizational groups also tend to identify
relatively average ideas produced by their members as more creative than other more novel ideas
created by other individuals (Rietzschel, et al., 2006). The findings of this study highlight the
importance of employing domain experts to evaluate creative products and ideas and reveal that
assessment of creativity is not a team sport. As required by the Consensual Assessment
Technique, and recommended by the participants in this study, assessment of creativity should
be done by individuals acting independently and without specific instructions. Using groups to
assess creativity may be problematic to the extent it introduces potential bias from other
participants, including confirmatory bias and group-think, as well as political effects as members
“choose consciously or subconsciously to ignore ideas, advocate for their own ideas, show
enthusiasm for others’ ideas, and provide interpersonal rewards for good ideas” (Rietzschel et al.,
2006: 347).
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
VI.1 Conclusions
This research provides rich insight into how small groups of domain experts identify and
evaluate the creative output of professionals in the real world setting of an awards contest. The
results of the research contradict some of the limited models and measurement constructs of
creativity used in research, and challenge the validity and reliability of research studies that
relied on non-experts to assess creative output. The results support the value of expert intuition
in making rapid, valid and reliable assessments of creativity, and the limited role rational
analysis plays in quantifying creativity of professional output and in reducing judgment error
from decision biases. While the results of the research cannot be generalized to a wider
population, the observations, analysis and reports from the participants provide strong evidence
in support of a broader operational definition and multiple factor measures of creativity in
products and ideas for both research and practice. Lastly, this research suggests numerous
opportunities for further research to refine our understanding of the nature of creativity and
identify how to better measure creative output.
VI.2 Recommendations for further research
Quantitative data in this study indicates that many of the expert judges of the creativity
contests reviewed did not award scores using the entire scale proposed by the contest
administrators. A review of the minimum and maximum scores given by judges in the contests
of this study indicated that, while most judges used the proposed 1-10 scale, some judges used a
scale ranging from 2 to 10, others used a scale of 5 to 9, and several judges used a scale of 0 to 9
but gave no entries a top scores of 10. Future research using detailed statistical analyses might
provide insights into whether rater effects affected the results of the scores or the contest. Rater
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effect analysis might also reveal whether expert judge scoring is less reliable in the “mid-range”
of creativity where the bias of subjectivity and personal variations in the weighting of various
factors of the creativity concept might have a greater impact. Another line of research might
involve test-retest reliability of expert judges over a long period. Would an item be considered
as creative in the years following its initial assessment? If so, what role if any does the criterion
of novelty play in the decision? As one of the criteria used by most judges is whether an entry is
“different,” “new”, or “surprising”, it is difficult to anticipate the consistency of judges’ scores
over time when that characteristic is no longer apparent. However, an experiment using similar
or the same items from a prior contest that subsequently asks judges to score them as to the level
of creativity at the time the item was first scored may yield insights into whether judges are
consistent in the comparison of items after the passage of time.
Brain imaging studies using fMRI have shown a correlation between the areas of the brain
engaged for different types of social and mechanical tasks (see Jack, et al, 2014) and suggest that
when the positive task system is engaged the default system is deactivated. A similar study
using both simple and complex items previously judged by experts as highly creative and less
creative might reveal insights into whether different information processing systems operate in
parallel or serial fashion when making aesthetic judgments.
Future research might also investigate whether expert and non-expert judges produce more
or less valid and reliable results when evaluating creativity in a group as opposed to
independently. The results of this research confirmed that awards judging in practice follows the
requirements set out in Amabile’s Consensual Assessment Technique that evaluators must make
their judgments independently and without consultation. One assumption of CAT appears to be
that judges acting together would negatively influence each other’s judgment. However, several
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participants in this study reported that judgments for “Best in Class” winners were made in open
group discussions and the judges expressed that the ultimate choices made in that setting were
highly valid. Additional research could test these assumptions among both non-experts and
experts, to see if non-expert judgments can be improved when evaluating creativity
collaboratively, and to assess whether expert judgment is less reliable when made in a group
setting as suggested by research into organizational creativity assessments. Research on the
latter question would have significant implications on the assessment of creativity in practice,
potentially leading to better models of decision making in organizations.
Similarly, a factor analysis comparing judges scores by separately applying each of the six
key elements of creativity reported in this study might reveal significant variation in what judges
rely on for their conclusions while still awarding very similar overall scores. For example, one
judge might give an entry high marks for novelty and execution, and thus a high overall score
where those items are heavily weighted, in comparison to another judge who might heavily
weight inventiveness and artisanship and score an item as high in creativity for quite different
reasons.
VI.3 Final Thoughts
Obviously, it would be simpler and cheaper if researchers could employ non-experts or
untrained evaluators to score creativity using an objective multi-dimension scale and achieve
relatively high validity and reliability. However, this research and other studies indicate nonexperts are ineffective judges of creativity and that objective scales are not used by domain
experts. Conversely, requiring the use of domain expert judges for every research study might
be overkill, particularly for simple evaluations of basic creativity. For example, Amabile, who
developed the Consensual Assessment Technique, successfully used psychology students to
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evaluate collages created by elementary school students in her research of task motivation. Such
an approach might be perfectly appropriate in some contexts; nonetheless, this study shows that
researchers need to use greater care when designing and evaluating creativity research studies.
Employing domain experts with experience in judging creativity and applying the appropriate
criteria is critical to assure reliability and validity in studies of creative outcome.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Applied Cognitive Task Analysis
This research utilized a modified form of cognitive task analysis called “applied cognitive
task analysis” to conduct semi-structured probe question interviews of expert judges. Cognitive
task analysis (CTA) is a set of methods designed to describe the various cognitive skills and
mental demands required to accomplish challenging and complex decisions and judgments
(Crandell, Klein & Hoffman, 2006). While there are many different types of cognitive analysis
methods and approaches within CTA, each aimed at achieving a unique aspect of cognitive
research, most are resource intensive, difficult to use, and often require specialized training or
experience in cognitive psychology (Hoffman & Woods, 2000). As a result, many CTA methods
tend to be of limited use to management scholars and researchers (Militello & Hutton, 1998).
Applied cognitive task analysis (ACTA) is a streamlined version of cognitive task
analysis developed for use by researchers not trained in cognitive psychology (Militello &
Hutton 1998; Crandell, Klein & Hoffman, 2006). ACTA provides a refined set of cognitive task
analysis techniques specifically designed to identify the key cognitive elements required to
perform mentally challenging or complex tasks (McAndrew & Gore 2013). Because ACTA
focuses on the key cognitive elements underlying difficult judgments and decisions, critical cues
and patterns and problem-solving strategies, it is particularly well suited to studying expert
decision making. ACTA has been used successfully in studies involving weather forecasting
(Hoffman et al., 2006), clinical nursing (Militellto & Lim 1995), currency trading (McAndrew &
Gore, 2013), military command and control (Drury & Darling, 2008), recruitment (Gore & Riley,
2004) and financial markets (McAndrew & Gore, 2007).
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As a streamlined method, ACTA presents a likely trade-off between usability and
resources, on the one hand, and power and comprehensiveness, on the other (Militello & Hutton,
1998; Crandell, Klein & Hoffman, 2006). As a result, ACTA techniques should not be expected
to produce information as comprehensive and specific as other more in-depth and systematic
forms of cognitive task analysis. However, ACTA methods have been shown to consistently
produce reliable, high-quality information about cognitive processes in various contexts, as well
as being more accessible to researchers without intensive training in cognitive psychology
(Militello & Hutton, 1998; McAndrew & Gore, 2013).
The ACTA Process:
The process of applied cognitive task analysis involves four complementary steps that are
designed to systematically build on one another to elicit high quality, task specific knowledge
(McAndrew & Gore, 2013). ACTA utilizes structured interviews, observation, and simulation to
elicit knowledge from subject matter experts (SMEs), and knowledge representation techniques,
e.g., cognitive mapping, to provide structure for organizing and comparing cognitive
information. The first step of ACTA involves the interviewer and the SME co-producing a task
diagram providing a broad overview of the task. In this initial step of the interview, the SME is
asked to decompose the task into subtasks with questions such as, “Think about what you do
when you (task of interest). Can you break this task down into less than six but not less than
three steps?” (Militello & Hutton, 1998). The SME is then asked which of the identified
subtasks require difficult cognitive effort. This step provides a “surface level” view of the task
and identifies specific areas of the task, or subtasks, requiring complex cognitive skills to be
explored in greater detail in subsequent steps.
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Step two of the process is the “knowledge audit,” where the SME reviews and explicates
the aspects of expertise required for effective execution of the critical cognitive subtasks
identified in step one. The knowledge audit draws directly on research on expert-novice
differences and critical decision method studies of expert decision-making to uncover the
demands of cognitively challenging tasks (Militello & Hutton, 1998). During the audit, the
interviewer uses generic and specific probes to elicit greater detail about the subtasks and
cognitive effort necessary to complete them effectively, including critical cues and strategies for
decision making. Concrete examples and specific information about past experiences and
comparisons between how experts and novices might perform the task are captured with the goal
of streamlining and improving data collection and analysis (Militello & Hutton, 1998;
McAndrew & Gore, 2013). The output of the knowledge audit is an inventory of the taskspecific expertise with examples of situations in which expertise is employed, cues and strategies
that are used to make decisions and an explanation of why the decision poses a challenge to
novices (Militello & Hutton, 1998).
The third step, the simulation interview, builds on the information obtained in the first
two steps to contextualize the task, and allows the interviewer to better understand the SME’s
cognitive processes. In the simulation interview, the SME is presented with a challenging brief
scenario that has been created in advance for the purposes of the interview. The interviewer
presents the challenge and asks the SME to imagine going through the scenario, visualizing the
steps involved. The interviewer then probes the SME on issues relating to situation assessment,
potential errors and biases, cues and patterns and other challenges the situation might present
(Militello & Hutton 1998). The information solicited is captured and recorded in a simulation
interview table for subsequent comparison and analysis across interviews.
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After the interviews are complete, the final step is creation of a “cognitive demands
table” of the information elicited in all the interviews, to merge and synthesize the data. The
cognitive demands table provides a format for the researcher to identify those areas requiring
complex cognitive skills and the pertinent problem-solving and decision-making activities
involved in the task (Militello & Hutton, 1998).

Appendix B: Review of Selected Creativity Studies
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Akinola
&
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Amabile

Amabile,
et al

2008

1982

1986
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Creativity:
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Vulnerabili
ty and
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Emotions
Lead to
Greater
Artistic
Creativity
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artistic
creativity:
Detrimenta
l effects of
competitio
n in a field
setting
Social
influences
on
creativity:
The effects
of

Inter-rater
reliability

Publication

Subject types

Rating by

Personality &
Social
Psychology
Bulletin

Young adults
ages 18-25,
general pop.,
N= 90; 65
females

4
“professiona
l artists” and
4 studio art
grad
students

.65 to .88

Personality &
Social
Psychology
Bulletin

Schoolgirls,
N=22 ages 711

“artistjudges”

“high”

Journal of
Personality and
Social
Psychology

Study 1:
N=115 boys
and girls,
ages 5-10;
Study 2:
N=80,
students, ages
8-11; Study

Study 1: 3
elementary
school
teachers;
Study 2:
“artistjudges” nfs;

Study 1:
.91;
Study 2:
.80;
Study 3:
.75
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contractedfor reward

Baer

Butler

Conti et
al.

Eisenber
ger &
Armeli

3: N=60
Study 3: 14
undergrad
“artists” nsf
women psych
students

1998

Gender
differences
in the
effects of
extrinsic
motivation
on
creativity.

1987

Taskinvolving
and egoinvolving
properties
of
evaluation

Journal of
education
psychology

N=100, top
performing
5th and 6th
grade
students

2001

The impact
of
competitio
n on
intrinsic
motivation
and
creativity

Personality and
Individual
Differences

N=50,
children ages
6-10

5 judges
with
“experience
in children’s
art”

0.82

Study 1:
N=296 5th
and 6th grade
students;
Study 2:
N=120 5th
and 6th grade
students

2 judges:
two judges
“assigned
each
drawing a
score equal
to the total
number of
times the
same topic
appeared in
the
population
of drawings”

Study 1:
0.99;
Study 2:
.98

1997

Can Salient
Reward
Increase
Creative
Performanc
e Without
Reducing
Intrinsic
Creative
Interest?

The Journal of
creative
behavior

N= 70 middle
school
4 “art
students, 35
educators”
male and 35
female

0.8

Count of #
of original
responses by
2 “judges”

.91-.93

Journal of
Personality and
Social
Psychology

144

Eisenber
ger et al.

Eisenber
ger et al.

Eisenber
ger &
Rhoades

Eisenber
ger &
Aselage

Friedman

1998

Can the
promise of
reward
increase
creativity?

1999

Promised
reward and
creativity:
Effects of
prior
experience

Journal of
Personality and
Social
Psychology

Journal of
Experimental
Social
Psychology

Journal of
Personality and
Social
Psychology

Study 1:
N=216 5th
grade
students;
Study 2: 220
5th and 6th
grade

2 judges,
same as
above; in
Study 2, 2nd
judge only
rated 60
items

Study 1:
.97;
Study 2:
.99 (60
only)

N=238 5th
and 6th
graders

2 judges,
same as
above

0.99

Study 1: N=
72 5th and
6th graders;
Study 2: N=
97 5th
graders ;
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Study 4: N=

Studies 1 &
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based on
novelty
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with quality;
Study 3: 3
undergrad
research
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Study 4 N/A

Study 1
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Study 3:
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Study 4
N/A

2001
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l effects of
reward on
creativity

2009
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l effects of
reward on
experience
d
Journal of
performanc
Organizational
e pressure:
Behavior
positive
outcomes
for intrinsic
interest and
creativity

Study 3:
N=405 intro
psych
students

2
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te research
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“The
intraclass
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n
coefficien
t for the
judges’
creativity
ratings
was .64.”

2009

Reinvestig
ating the
effects of
promised
reward on
creativity

Study 1:
N=81
undergrad
intro psych
students;
Study 2:
N=108

Study 1: 22
undergrad
coders;
Study 2: 14
coders

Study 1:
.84;
Study 2:
.96

Creativity
Research
Journal

145

undergrad
intro psych
students

Gerrard,
et al.

Glover &
Zimmer

Hennesse
y

Hennesse
y et al.

1996

Promoting
children's
creativity:
Effects of
competitio
n, selfesteem,
and
immunizati
on.

Creativity
Research
Journal

N=103 3rd
grade
children

2 art
professors
and 1 grad
art student
rated on
“creativity”
and
“quality”; 21
teachers of
gifted
children also
rated on
“creativity”

.69-.72
for art
judges;
for
teachers
.89-.92

N=24 5th
graders

2 ed psych
students
rated the
quality of
questions
5th grade
students
asked during
class before
and after
treatment

Not
given.

1982

Procedures
to
influence
levels of
questions
asked by
students.

1989

The effect
of extrinsic
constraints
Creativity
on
Research
children's
Journal
creativity
while using
a computer

N=66
children, age
7 - 13

Unknown

Immunizin
g children
against the
negative
effects of
reward

Study 1:
N=113 3rd5th graders,
age 7-11;
Study 2:
N=58 3rd
graders

Study 1; 3
elementary
school
teachers
rated
children's
stories on
“creativity”;
Study 2: 12

1989

The Journal of
General
Psychology

Contemporary
educational
psychology

Study 1:
.80;
Study 2:
.70
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elementary
school
teachers
“familiar
with the
work of 3rd
graders”
rated
collages

1993

Immunizin
g children
against the
negative
effects of
reward: A
further
examinatio
n of
intrinsic
motivation
training
techniques

Creativity
Research
Journal

N=41 8-10
year olds

Rated
creative
stories.
Abstract
only, no
other info

Kachelm
2008
eier, et al.

Measuring
and
Motivating
Quantity,
Creativity,
or Both

Journal of
Accounting
Research

N=78
undergrad
business
students

11 doctoral
students

CA .86

Moran &
Liou

Effects of
reward on
creativity
in college
students of
two levels
of ability.

N=80 college
students

2 “judges”

.85-.98

N=42 psych
undergrads

3 grad psych
students

0.62

Hennesse
y&
Zbikows
ki

Selart et
al.

1982

2008

Effects of
Reward on
Selfregulation,
Intrinsic
Motivation
and
Creativity

Perceptual and
motor skills

Scandinavian
Journal of
Educational
Research

147

Aime, et
al.

Chua

Mattern,
et al

Schuhma
cher and
Kuester

2014

The riddle
of
hierarchy:
Power
transitions
in crossfunctional
teams

2013

The costs
of ambient
cultural
disharmon
y: Indirect
intercultura
l conflicts
in social
environme
nt
undermine
creativity

2013

Matching
Creativity
Perceptions
and
Capabilitie Journal of
s:
Advertising
Exploring
Education
the Impact
of
Feedback
Messages.

N=849
college
students

4 researchers
rated
Alternative
Uses Task
responses
for
originality,
flexibility
and
elaboration.

Cohen's
Kappa:
.92, .98
and .99

2012

Identificati
on of Lead
User
Characteris
tics
Driving the
Quality of
Service
Innovation
Ideas

2 soccer
club
webpage
user/manage
N=120 Mturk rs, judged
users, avg
novelty,
age 33 years feasibility
and
relevance
each on 7
point scale

Cohen's
Kappa:
.87

Academy of
Management
Journal

Academy of
Management
Journal

Creativity and
Innovation
Management

N=131,
divided into
teams of 4-5,
business
school
students, avg
age 21

3 upper level
PhD.
students
with prior
work
experience.
Scale 1 -10.

(ICC(1,
k) = .63,
ICC(2, k)
= .65, F
= 2.88,
p< .001 ,
rwg =
.82).

Study 1:
N=188, avg
age 34, from
Mturk; Study
2: N=264
college
students

Study 1: 2
coders
experienced
in fashion
design; ideas
task; scale
1-7; Study 2:
2
entrepreneur
s; business
ideas task;
scale 1-7

Study 1:
ICC .78.88,
agreemen
t .68-.81;
Study 2:
ICC .89.90,
agreemen
t .82

148

Grant &
Berry

2011

Santanen,
2004
et al.

Ray &
Romano

2013

The
Necessity
of Others is
the Mother
of
Invention:
Intrinsic
Academy of
and
Management
Prosocial
Journal
Motivation
s,
Perspective
Taking,
and
Creativity

N=100
undergrads

Students
with work
experience
in music
business (34 years)
rated ideas
for
generating
revenue on
creativity, 17 scale

ICC2:
.69,
agreemen
t: .63

Causal
Relationshi
ps in
Creative
Problem
Solving:
Comparing
Facilitation
In...

6 disaster
relief experts
rated
solutions to
water crisis
N=244 MIS
scenario; 4
undergrad
university
students in 61 officials
four person
rated
teams
solutions for
School of
Business
problem. 15
years avg
experience

.834 for
water
crisis; .91
for
business
problem.

Journal of
Management
Information
Systems

Creative
Problem
Solving in
GSS
Group Decision
Groups: Do and Negotiation
Creative
Styles
Matter?

N=250
business
school
students, avg
age 28

Unstated
number of
judges
(faculty with
background
in creativity
and student
judges) rated Unk
group ideas
on Coffee
Shop
problem on
novelty,
costeffectiveness

149

and
feasibility

Shalley

PerrySmith &
Shalley

1995

Effects of
coaction,
expected
evaluation,
and goal
setting on
creativity
and
productivit
y

2014

A Social
Compositio
n View of
Team
Creativity:
The Role
Organization
of Member
science
Nationality
Heterogene
ous Ties
Outside of
the Team

Litchfield
2011
, et al.

Directing
idea
generation
using
brainstormi
ng with
specific
novelty
goals

Academy of
Management
Journal

Motivation &
Emotion

N=84
undergrads,
avg age 22

3 doctoral
students
with some
HR work
experience
and MBA or
MA judged
creativity of
responses to
an HR
manager inbasket
complexheuristic
exercise,
scale 1-7

Cronbach'
s alpha:
.77

N=82 longterm MBA
teams of four
to six
individuals

2 doctoral
students and
2 professors
independentl
y rated
creativity of
team’s final
projects

Interrater
reliability
: rwg2
with a
mean
rwg2 .82
and a
median
rwg2 .88.

N=147
college
freshman

average
rwg for
2 college
novelty
students
(.78),
rated
creativity
novelty,
(.79),
creativity,
effectiveness effectiven
ess (.77),
and
practicality, and
practicalit
scale 1-5
y (.71)
(James et
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al. 1984,
1993)

Journal of
Managerial
Psychology

N=119
nurses who
reported
“creative
ideas” in a
broader
survey, avg
age 34

3 registered
nurses with
10 to 30
years
teaching
experience,
rated on
novelty,
usefulness
and overall
creativity, 110 scale

ICC of
.89

Australian
Journal of
Management

N=63 college
students avg
age 20,
provided
ideas for a
business
problem

3 graduate
business
students
with some
work
experience

Interrater
reliability
of .59.65;
Cronbach
’s alpha
of .79.

Matthing,
2006
et al.

Developing
successful
technology
-based
services:
The Journal of
the issue of Services
identifying Marketing
and
involving
innovative
users

N=52
university
students and
others on
campus,
provided new
mobile phone
service ideas

4 panels, 3
judges each
from R&D,
Tech and
Marketing
dept of
phone
company,
plus a panel
of 6
consumers,
rated
“originality”
of ideas on
1-10 scale

Pearson's
r, .69-.79,
p<.01

Williams

Personality
, attitude,
and leader
influences

N=208
nonacademic
employees of
a university,

4 judges
with
graduate
degrees in

ICC:
novelty
.71,
usefulnes

Binnewie
s, et al.

Wynder

2008

Age and
creativity
at work:
The
interplay
between
job
resources,
age and
idea
creativity

2007

The
Interaction
Between
DomainRelevant
Knowledge
and
Control
System
Design on
Creativity

2004

European
Journal of

151

on
divergent
thinking
and
creativity
in
organizatio
ns

Innovation
Management

asked to
provide
“suggestions
for
improvement
”

s .59,
combined
as
creativity
.78

Management
Science

N=40
systems
professionals
from a local
information
center and
senior
undergrad
and grad MIS
students,
asked to
respond to
open-ended
questions

3 judges,
members of
faculty at
business
school

0.77

2 “experts”
rated on
imaginativen
ess,
innovativene
ss and value
addition.

Cronbach
’s alpha:
.90, .95,
.97.

3
professional
artist / art

not
reported

1997

Creativity
enhanceme
nt in
problem
solving:
Through
software or
process?

Sosak, et
al.

1997

Effects of
leadership
style and
anonymity
on group
potency
and
effectivene
ss in a
group
decision
support
system
environme
nt

Journal of
Applied
Psychology

N=159
undergrad
students,
asked to
generate
recommendat
ions for an
economic
development
program

Runco, et
al.

1994

Judgments
of the
creativity

The Journal of
Psychology

N=47 visual
art college
students,

Marakas
& Elam

management
, experience
working at
universities
and as
management
consultants,
rated novelty
and
usefulness
on 1-11
scale
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of artwork
from
students
and
professiona
l artists
Elaborated
Role Play
and
Creativity
in
Preschool
Age
Children

Mottweil
er and
Taylor

2014

Pretz &
Collum

SelfPerceptions
of
Creativity
Do Not
2014 Always
Reflect
Actual
Creative
Performanc
e

Baer, et
al.

created a 3D
art project

instructor
judges, 1-7
scale, and
students
judged each
other’s work

Psychology of
Aesthetics,
Creativity and
the Arts

N=75
children,
aged 4 to 5,
asked to
complete a
story stem
and N=56
same age
asked to draw
a picture

Two authors
and research
assistant
rated
creativity on
scale of 1-5

Cronbach
’s alpha
.95 for
stories,
and .88
for the
drawings

Psychology of
Aesthetics,
Creativity and
the Arts

N=90 4th
year college
undergrads.
3 creativity
tasks: ideas
for $1 million
donation,
photo
caption, and
essay on
“dream”
project

Ideas rated
by 6 psych
research
assistants;
“captions
and essay
also rated.”

“Interrate
rs
reliabiliti
es were”
.862,
.825, .892
and .731.

Ideas rated
by 3
research
assistants on
creativity,
scale 1-5

“the
median
interrater
agreemen
t
coefficien
t (rwg);
and two
intraclass
correlatio
n
coefficien
ts:
rwg2=.80
;
ICC=.37,

Win or lose
the battle
for creative
creativity:
Academy of
The power
2010
Management
and perils
Journal
of
intergroup
competitio
n

N=280
undergrads,
in 70 4
person
groups,
performed 2
idea
generation
tasks on
improving
student life

153

ICC2=.64
”

Silvia

Discernme
nt and
Creativity:
2008
How Well
Can People
Identify
Their Most
Creative
Ideas?

Psychology of
Aesthetics,
Creativity and
the Arts

N=226
college psych
students,
created 4
divergent
ideas, then
chose the 2
most creative

Ideas rated
by
undergrad
research
assistants on
originality,
scale 1-5

Total “expert” judges = 4 /
41

Not
reported.
Comparis
on was
correlatio
n between
participan
ts’ top 2
choices
with
judges
ratings
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